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REAL ESTATE AND LAND USE LAW
Brian R. Marron *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will consider recent cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Virginia, as well as cases decided by federal courts ap-
plying Virginia law. It will also outline bills enacted by the 2004
General Assembly that will have an impact on real estate law.
II. RECENT CASE LAW
A. Condominiums /Property Owners'Associations
In the case of Dogwood Valley Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Winkel-
man,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a non-
stock Virginia corporation could be considered a property owners'
association within the meaning of the Property Owners' Associa-
tion Act ("POAA").2 The Dogwood Valley Citizens Association
("DVCA") received an assignment from the original developer of
certain rights and remedies set forth in the original covenants re-
corded against the Dogwood Valley subdivision. The covenants af-
forded to the declarant and its successors the right to use, keep,
and maintain all the roads and common facilities in the subdivi-
sion as well as the power to assess an annual fee for the use, up-
keep, and maintenance of the roads and other common facilities
in the subdivision as well as the power to assess an annual fee for
* Principal, Cantor Arkema, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1981, Muhlenberg Col-
lege; J.D., 1984, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. He would
like to extend his thanks to Tonia E. Peake, Esquire, for assisting in the research of this
project.
1. 267 Va. 7, 590 S.E.2d 358 (2004).
2. Id. at 8-9, 590 S.E.2d at 358. The Property Owners' Association Act is codified at
Virginia Code sections 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp. 2004).
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the use, upkeep, and maintenance of the roads and other common
facilities.3 DVCA adopted a special assessment applicable to all
lots in the subdivision and notified all of the property owners of
this obligation.4 One of the property owners, Winkelman, failed to
pay the assessment on time.5 DVCA filed a memorandum of lien
against Winkelman's lots and began proceedings to sell the prop-
erty as satisfaction of the unpaid assessments, pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 55-516(I).6 The sale was conducted, and a
third-party purchaser bid at the sale.7 Winkelman then filed an
action in the Greene County Circuit Court to set aside the sale.8
In seeking to set aside the sale, Winkelman argued that DVCA
lacked the statutory authority to conduct a non-judicial sale be-
cause such authority can only be exercised by a property owners'
association as defined in Virginia Code section 55-59.9
The Greene County Circuit Court found that DVCA was a
property owners' association as defined in the POAA.'0 The court
held, however, that a sale under the POAA could only apply to a
"unit" as defined in Virginia Code section 55-516(I), and therefore
the statute "did not confer authority upon DVCA to sell Winkel-
man's vacant lots."" The circuit court voided the sale, giving rise
to an appeal.'2
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed that the sale should be
voided, but on different grounds. The court determined that
DVCA was not a property owners' association because the cove-
3. Id. at 11, 590 S.E.2d at 359.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 359-60.
7. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 360.
8. Id.
9. Id. To support his argument, Winkelman cited the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead Civic Ass'n, Inc., 255 Va. 264, 483 S.E.2d 209
(1997). In Anderson, the court noted that
[Ilt is clear that in order to qualify under the POAA, an association must pos-
sess both the power to collect a fixed assessment or to make variable assess-
ments and a corresponding duty to maintain the common area. In addition,
these conditions must be expressly stated in a recorded instrument in the
land records of the jurisdiction where some portion of the development is lo-
cated.
Anderson, 253 Va. at 271-72, 483 S.E.2d at 213.
10. Dogwood Valley Citizens Ass'n, 267 Va. at 9, 590 S.E.2d at 358.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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nants did not impose upon the association maintenance or opera-
tional responsibilities for the common areas.13 The declaration
merely granted to the declarant and its successors the right to do
so. 14 To qualify as a property owners' association under the Act,
"an association must possess both the power to collect a fixed as-
sessment or to make variable assessments and a corresponding
duty to maintain the common area," 5 both of which "must be ex-
pressly stated in a recorded instrument in the land records of the
jurisdiction where some portion of the development is located." 6
This duty may not be "inferred or implied." 7 The supreme court
ruled that the circuit court "erred when it concluded in its decree
that DVCA [was] a property owners' association" and reversed
that part of the lower court's ruling. 8 The court also affirmed
those portions of the circuit court's voiding the deeds purporting
to sell Winkelman's lots.'9
In the case of Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King,2" the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether the unit owners' association
could be liable for negligence arising out of a breach of security in
one of the units.2' The plaintiff, King, owned a condominium unit
in the Atrium, a high rise condominium complex in Arlington
County.22 As required by the condominium association rules and
regulations, King provided the general manager of the condomin-
ium with a key to her unit for use in case of an emergency.23 The
rules also provided for the right of a unit owner to deposit an ad-
ditional "convenience key" with the general manager for use by
persons specifically authorized by the unit owner,24 which King
13. Id. at 13-14, 590 S.E.2d at 361.
14. Id. at 14, 590 S.E.2d at 361.
15. Id. at 13, 590 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead Civic Ass'n,
Inc., 253 Va. 264, 271-72, 483 S.E.2d at 813 (1997)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 14, 590 S.E.2d at 361.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 14-15, 590 S.E.2d at 361-62.
20. 266 Va. 288, 585 S.E.2d 545 (2003).
21. Id. at 290, 585 S.E.2d at 596.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
20041
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did before departing for California.25 King's unit was burglarized
while she was out of town.26
King filed a motion for judgment in the circuit court against
the unit owners' association, as well as the management com-
pany, alleging that Atrium was negligent in its training of em-
ployees and in the management of her spare keys, arguing that
the burglar either used a key or entered through an unsecured
door or window.27 Testimony further indicated that the estab-
lished procedures for logging keys in and out were not followed.28
Both employees and non-employees of the management company
had access to the box where convenience keys were stored.29 The
court denied the unit owners' association's motion to strike and
sent the case to the jury.3 ° The jury returned a verdict in favor of
King.3
1
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the verdict, finding
that King had failed to sustain her burden of establishing "a
causal connection between the defendant's alleged negligence and
the injury of which the plaintiff complain[ed]."32 Although access
through the balcony would have been difficult, it was not impos-
sible. There was no evidence presented at trial that the missing
convenience key was used in the commission of the burglary.3
"Proof of 'possibility' of causal connection is not sufficient" to
carry the plaintiffs burden.34
The court distinguished this case from the case of Wooldridge v.
Echelon Service Co. ,3 wherein a woman had been fatally attacked
in a building for which Echelon provided security services.36 At
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 291, 585 S.E.2d at 546. Testimony at trial also indicated that "the distance
between balconies would make access 'from balcony to balcony' difficult." Id., 585 S.E.2d at
547.
28. Id. at 291-92, 585 S.E.2d at 547.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 292, 585 S.E.2d at 547.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 295, 585 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting Commercial Distribs., Inc. v. Blankenship,
240 Va. 382, 395, 397 S.E.2d 840, 847 (1990)).
33. Id. at 295-96, 585 S.E.2d at 549.
34. Id. at 296, 585 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting Wilkins v. Sibley, 205 Va. 171, 175, 135
S.E.2d 765, 767 (1964)).
35. 243 Va. 458, 416 S.E.2d 441 (1992).
36. Id. at 459-60, 416 S.E.2d at 442.
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trial, the evidence showed that a security guard had not reacted
to an unauthorized person gaining admittance to the building."
Shortly after the intruder entered the building, one of the occu-
pants was killed.38 At the time of the murder, the intruder was
the only unauthorized person in the building.39 There was suffi-
cient evidence in the case that the intruder was indeed the perpe-
trator of the crime,40 and the security guard's "inaction was a
proximate cause of [the victim's] death."4 '
The case of Klaiber v. Freemason Associates, Inc.42 arose out of
alleged defects in the roof, chimneys, fireplaces, and flues within
a four-unit condominium.43 Both the association and several of
the unit owners filed claims against the developer.4 4 The trial
court severed the plaintiffs' individual claims from those of the
association and directed that each case proceed independently.45
Two of the unit owners sold their units at a profit during the
pendency of the litigation.46 The unit owners' claims against the
developer were advanced under the theories of "actual fraud,
fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, false advertis-
ing provided by Code § 59.1-68.3, breach of contract, and breach
of the statutory warranty provided by Code § 55-79.79 of the
Condominium Act."47 Each plaintiff sought compensatory dam-
ages of $380,000.48 During discovery, the plaintiffs established
that the association had paid in excess of $37,000 to repair the
roof for which the unit owners were assessed over $14,000 each.49
Additionally, the unit owners paid for repairs to their own units
arising from water damage and damage to fireplace fixtures, but
expended well less than the $380,000 claim amount.50 The unit
owners argued that their damages were for future special as-
37. Id. at 461-62, 416 S.E.2d at 443.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 462, 416 S.E.2d at 443.
42. 266 Va. 478, 587 S.E.2d 555 (2003).
43. Id. at 482, 587 S.E.2d at 556.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 556-57.
47. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 557.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 483, 587 S.E.2d at 557.
50. Id. at 482-83, 587 S.E.2d at 557.
20041
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sessments for roof replacement, attorney's fees, and repair and
refurbishment of fireplaces and chimneys. 1 The developer filed a
motion for summary judgment, claiming that neither unit owner
could prove damages because both had sold their units at a profit
and that they would have no liability with respect to repair of the
defects in the roofs, chimneys, or fireplaces because they had sold
their units and would no longer be liable for assessments arising
from those repairs. 52 The individual unit owners contended that
they had alleged an adequate measure of their damages because
they expressly reserved their rights in this litigation in their
agreements with the unit purchasers, that they had been sub-
jected to special assessments for prior repairs, and that the profit
each had earned in the sale of their units should not affect their
claims.53
Finding for the developer, the lower court held that the indi-
vidual unit owners should not be permitted to maintain their
various claims with regard to the alleged defects in chimneys,
fireplaces, and flues, which were common elements.' Also, nei-
ther unit owner had alleged an injury with sufficient specificity to
recover damages under the three fraud claims.5 The unit owners
not only sold their units at a profit, but neither unit owner had
suffered any "loss" as required by Virginia Code section 59.1-68.3,
nor had the unit owners suffered injury sufficient to give rise to a
breach of warranty claim.56
Because the trial court ruled in favor of the developer on sum-
mary judgment, the Supreme Court of Virginia was charged with
whether, as a matter of law, the unit owners would be unable to
prove any injury or resulting damages arising from the acts of the
developer under the claims of liability advanced.57 In order to sus-
tain the fraud claims, the unit owners were required to plead "a
false representation of material fact; made intentionally, in the
case of actual fraud, or negligently, in the case of constructive
fraud; reliance on that false representation to their detriment;
51. Id.
52. Id. at 483, 587 S.E.2d at 557.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 484, 587 S.E.2d at 557.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 485, 587 S.E.2d at 558.
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and resulting damage."" This claim must not be made "'in the ab-
stract,"' but rather "'must be accompanied by [an] allegation and
proof of damage."'59 There can be no successful claim for fraud in
any case where "'the position of the complaining party is no worse
than it would be had the alleged fraud not been committed."'6 °
Where the alleged fraud occurs in a real estate transaction, the
measure of damages is "'the difference between the actual value
of the property at the time the contract was made and the value
that the property would have possessed had the [fraudulent] rep-
resentation been true."'61 The unit owners could not allege suffi-
cient facts to support a conclusion that the actual value of their
units at the time they purchased them was less than the value
those units would have had absent the fraudulent acts of the de-
veloper.62 As such, the court refused to use repair or replacement
costs as the proper measure of damages for fraud in these cases.63
Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on the fraud claims.64
The court also concluded that the unit owners' claims under
Virginia Code section 59.1-68.36' arising out of alleged "untrue,
deceptive, and misleading statements in advertising" in violation
of Virginia Code section 18.2-21666 must also fail.67 Again, the
court concluded that, to be successful, a plaintiff must "suffer
loss." Given that the units were sold at a profit, no loss could be
proven as a matter of law.68
Unlike the fraud claims and the claims of false advertising for
58. Id. (citing Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 148, 439 S.E.2d 387,
390 (1994)).
59. Id. (quoting Community Bank v. Wright, 221 Va. 172, 175, 267 S.E.2d 158, 160
(1980)).
60. Id. (quoting Community Bank, 221 Va. at 175, 267 S.E.2d at 160)).
61. Id. at 486, 587 S.E.2d at 558-59 (quoting Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va.
75, 91, 515 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1999)).
62. Id. at 486, 587 S.E.2d at 559.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Virginia Code section 59.1-68.3 provides, in pertinent part, that "[any person who
suffers loss as the result of a violation of Article 8 (§ 18.2-2 14 et seq.) ... shall be entitled
to bring an individual action to recover damages, or $100, whichever is greater." VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-68.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
66. Advertising that is "untrue, deceptive or misleading" is punishable as a class 1
misdemeanor. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
67. Klaiber, 266 Va. at 487, 587 S.E.2d at 559.
68. Id.
2004]
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which the claimant must show actual loss, the court ruled that a
claim for breach of contract or breach of warranty is not necessar-
ily limited to the same measure of damages.69 According to the
court, "[ulnder certain circumstances, a party seeking to restore
the benefit of a bargain or to enforce a warranty is permitted to
show that the cost of remedying the breach is the appropriate
measure of damages,"" unless "'the cost to repair would be
grossly disproportionate to the results to be obtained, or would
involve unreasonable economic waste.' 71 The trial court under-
took no analysis of whether the award of repair cost would consti-
tute economic waste.72 Consequently, the supreme court deter-
mined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on the breach of contract and the breach of warranty claims be-
cause the trial court could not have concluded as a matter of law
that the unit owners could prove no loss merely because they sold
the units for more than they paid for them.73
B. Restrictive Covenants
In Richardson v. Amresco Residential Mortgage Corp., the
court considered "whether the chancellor erred in ruling that cer-
tain mortgagees were entitled to protections afforded third par-
ties under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act" ("UTMA").75 In
this case, the chain of title to the property against which the
mortgage lien was recorded contained a deed from a custodian in
her representative capacity to the custodian individually.76 The
custodian, the child's mother, had been appointed to oversee a
$700,000 wrongful death settlement from the child's father's es-
tate.7 7 The child's mother was appointed guardian of the estate in
69. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 560.
70. Id. (citing Lochaven Co. v. Master Pools by Schertle, Inc., 233 Va. 537, 543, 357
S.E.2d 534, 538 (1987)).
71. Id. at 488, 587 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Lochaven Co., 233 Va. at 543, 357 S.E.2d at
538).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. 267 Va. 43, 592 S.E.2d 65 (2004).
75. Id. at 45, 592 S.E.2d at 66. The Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is codi-
fied at Virginia Code sections §§ 31-37 to -59 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
76. Id. at 46, 592 S.E.2d at 66.
77. Id.
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Kentucky and subsequently relocated to Virginia Beach.7" The
mother used a portion of the estate to acquire real property, act-
ing in her capacity as the custodian for the child's estate under
Kentucky's version of the UTMA.79 The mother, in her capacity as
custodian, then conveyed the property to herself through a quit-
claim deed. ° She did so without consideration and to use the
property as security for a personal loan.8 ' The personal loan was
secured by the mortgage that was the subject of the litigation and
which, subsequently, fell into default.8 2 The mortgagee was not
notified by counsel of the quitclaim deed in connection with the
loan transaction. 3
Subsequently, a guardian ad litem was appointed for the child,
who obtained from the court an injunction against the mother
from "'selling, destroying, giving away, disposing of, changing, ad-
justing or causing to be diminished in value any assets of the
guardianship.' 84 Notwithstanding this order, the mother entered
into a contract to sell the property to a third party, which precipi-
tated her removal as guardian. 5 The newly appointed substitute
guardian ad litem filed a quiet title action, seeking to expunge
the quitclaim deed and all of the liens placed on the property by
the mother, individually." The chancellor ordered the property
sold to the third parties with the proceeds to be placed in trust,
pending the outcome of the litigation. 7
The chancellor held that the mortgagees were entitled to the
protections afforded third parties under the "safe harbor" provi-
sions of both the Kentucky and Virginia UTMAs. 8 Under both
statutes, a third person in good faith, without actual knowledge of
wrongdoing, may conduct a transaction with a custodian and is
not responsible for determining: "1) The validity of the purported
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 46-47, 592 S.E.2d at 66-67.
82. Id. at 47, 592 S.E.2d at 67.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 47-48, 592 S.E.2d at 67.
87. Id. at 48, 592 S.E.2d at 67-68.
88. Id., 592 S.E.2d at 68 (citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 385.162 and VA. CODE ANN. §
31-52). The court noted that the Kentucky statute was substantially identical to the provi-
sions found in the parallel Virginia Code sections. Id.
2004]
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custodian's designation; 2) The propriety of ... any act of the
purported custodian; 3) The validity or propriety ... of any in-
strument or any instructions . . .; or 4) The propriety of the appli-
cation of any property of the minor delivered to the purported
custodian."89 The substitute guardian ad litem appealed this deci-
sion, asserting that the quitclaim deed should have provided ac-
tual knowledge to the mortgagees, removing them from the "safe
harbor."9" The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the lower
court, noting that:
[I]t is a settled principle of equity that trustees and all persons act-
ing in a confidential character with respect to [a] subject of sale are
disqualified from purchasing the property for themselves.... The
validity of a sale in such case does not depend upon its fairness, but
the sale is voidable, and when attacked, must be set aside, although
the price was fair, or the best to be had, and the motive pure.
9 1
Applying the equity principle to the fiduciary relationship, the
court further noted that "[s]uch a sale by a person acting as a fi-
duciary constitutes a constructive fraud, and must be set aside
when attacked.92
The court also concluded that the mortgagees in this case were
not the intended beneficiaries of the UTMA, noting that the
UTMA provides protection to third parties who "'deal with' a
"'person purporting to make a transfer or purporting to act in the
capacity of a custodian."'93 "[S]uch protections do not extend to
those who merely rely on various acts of a custodian."94 When the
mother executed the mortgage in favor of the mortgagees, she
was not purporting to act in the capacity of a custodian. 95 Rather,
she was purporting to convey the property, to secure the mort-
gage, in her individual capacity. 96 Therefore, the protections af-
forded by the UTMA did not apply to the mortgagees' transaction
89. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 385.162).
90. Id at 49-50, 592 S.E.2d at 68-69.
91. Id. at 49, 592 S.E.2d at 68. (quoting Smith v. Credico Indus. Loan Co., 234 Va. 514,
516, 362 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1987)).
92. Id. (citing Whitlow v. Mountain Trust Bank, 215 Va. 149, 152, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840
(1974)).
93. Id. at 50, 592 S.E.2d at 69; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 31-52 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
94. Id. at 50-51, 592 S.E.2d at 69.
95. Id. at 51, 592 S.E.2d at 69.
96. Id.
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with the mother."
The court also concluded that the mortgagees were not bona-
fide purchasers, because the mortgagees had constructive notice
of the quitclaim deed which, on its face, was a voidable and im-
permissible act by a fiduciary." The court held that "a purchaser
of real property has constructive notice not only of the facts ap-
pearing on the face of recorded documents in the chain of title,
but also of such other facts of which the purchaser is placed on
inquiry based on those recorded instruments."99 In this case, the
quitclaim deed should have prompted an inquiry as to the
mother's self-dealing. 100
In the case of Meliani v. Jade Dunn Loring Metro, L.L.C.,'0 ' the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
applying Virginia law, considered the question of whether a
plaintiff asserting fraud and breach of contract in connection with
a contract for the sale of a single condominium unit in a multi-
phase condominium project may file a memorandum of lis
pendens burdening property in other phases of the project in
which he neither has nor asserts an interest."0 2 The plaintiff,
Meliani, entered into a contract for the purchase of a condomin-
ium unit in phase two of the development for the purchase price
of $279,900.°3 During the pendency of the purchase contract, the
condominium unit appreciated in value by approximately
$100,000.104 The developer, Jade, also entered into several sales
contracts with other buyers for the purchase of other units lo-
cated in phases one and two of the complex.0 5 Jade alleged that it
became insolvent and subsequently lost phases one and two
through foreclosure.' 6 Jade conveyed phases three, four, and five
of the project to Westbriar, a new entity which had been formed
97. Id.
98. Id. at 52, 592 S.E.2d at 70.
99. Id. (citing Shaheen v. County of Mathews, 265 Va. 462, 477, 579 S.E.2d 162, 171-
72 (2003)).
100. See id.
101. 286 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Va. 2003).
102. Id. at 742.
103. Id. at 743.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
2004]
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by Jade's former principals. 1 7 Meliani alleged that a related en-
tity to Jade purchased phases one and two at foreclosure as part
of a scheme to avoid the below-market purchase agreements for
phases one and two.'08
Meliani filed a complaint alleging tortious interference with
contract, conspiracy, voluntary and fraudulent conveyance,
breach of contract, and conversion, which was supported by a lis
pendens filed on all five phases of the project.0 9 Westbriar filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order, requiring the plaintiff
to remove the lis pendens from phases three, four, and five."0 In
holding that the lis pendens must be quashed as to phases three,
four, and five, the court cited Virginia Code section 8.01-268(B),
which provides that a plaintiff may not file a memorandum of lis
pendens on property unless the plaintiff seeks to establish an in-
terest in the property against which the memorandum is filed."'
The object of the [lis pendens] rule is to preserve the property which
is the subject of litigation, so as to enable the court, when the ques-
tions involved in the suit are finally determined, to execute its jud -
ment or decree and to prevent further suits for the same subjects.
The court further noted that the lis pendens statute is not in-
tended as a pre-judgment attachment to assure that there is suf-
ficient value available to satisfy a judgment for damages."' 3
Meliani also contended that, because the defendant fraudu-
lently conveyed the condominium unit, Virginia Code section 55-
821" operated "to provide him with a lien on, and hence an inter-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 744.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 745 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-268(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.
2004)).
112. Id. at 744--45 n.3 (quoting 12A MICHIE'S JUR. Lis Pendens § 2 (1989)).
113. Id. at 746.
114. Virginia Code section § 55-82 provides:
A creditor before obtaining a judgment or decree for his claim may, whether
such claim be due and payable or not, institute any suit which he might insti-
tute after obtaining such judgment or decree to avoid a gift, conveyance, as-
signment or transfer of, or charge upon, the estate of his debtor declared void
by either § 55-80 or § 55-81; and he may in such suit have all the relief in re-
spect to such estate to which he would be entitled after obtaining a judgment
or decree for the claim which he may be entitled to recover. A creditor avail-
ing himself of this section shall have a lien from the time of bringing his suit
[Vol. 39:357
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est in, all of Westbriar's property, including phases three, four,
and five, thereby permitting him to file a memorandum of lis
pendens on those phases."115 The court found that the plaintiff
had misread Virginia Code section 55-82 because the plaintiff
could not allege that Jade defrauded him when it conveyed
phases three, four, and five to Westbriar because the plaintiff had
no interest in phases three, four, and five.'16 At most, his interest
only extended to the unit he contracted for in phase two. Virginia
Code section 55-82 states explicitly that it is subject to and thus
limited by the lis pendens statutes.
117
In River Heights Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Batten,"' the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether to allow enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants prohibiting commercial use on four
unimproved lots within the Carrsbrook subdivision in Albemarle
County."9 In this case, the restrictive covenants were recorded
against a forty-acre parcel which was subsequently developed for
residential purposes, with the exception of the lots in question. 2 °
Most notable among the restrictions contained in the declaration
is that "[t]he property is to be used for residential purposes only
and no rooming house, boarding house, tourist home, or any other
type of commercial enterprise, or any church, hospital, asylum, or
charitable institution shall be operated thereon." 2'
The existing undeveloped lots provided a buffer between the
existing residents and the Route 29 corridor in Charlottesville. 22
Between the time the property was first platted and the time of
suit, Route 29 had grown from a two-lane road to an eight- to ten-
lane road that was highly developed on both sides.'23 No resi-
dences had been located along Route 29 since 1959, and the lots
in question were zoned to a depth of 200 feet from Route 29 in a
B-1 classification, a commercial district in which residential use
on all the estate, real and personal, hereinbefore mentioned....
Meliani, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 746 n.10.
115. Id. at 747.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 267 Va. 262, 591 S.E.2d 683 (2004).
119. Id. at 265, 591 S.E.2d at 684.
120. Id. at 266, 591 S.E.2d at 685.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 267, 591 S.E.2d at 685.
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was prohibited.'24 The owners of the lots in question had ap-
proached the residents in the subdivision with a proposed com-
mercial development plan in an effort to obtain their support for
certain land use permitting. 125
Certain lot owners filed a complaint for declaratory judgment,
seeking a declaration favoring the enforceability of the restrictive
covenants. 26 The developer demurred and later filed a motion to
strike the evidence in the case. 12' At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court determined that the covenants were enforceable and en-
joined the use or operation of the lots in violation of the cove-
nant. 1
28
In his first assignment of error, citing City of Fairfax v. Shank-
lin, 29 the developer stated that his demurrer should have been
granted and that there was no justiciable claim before the court
upon which the court could award declaratory relief and an in-
junction. 3 ° The developer alleged that "'something more than
mere speculation.. . is required [to] invoke the power of the
Courts. '""' In denying the developer's motion, the court distin-
guished the present case from Shanklin, reasoning that the de-
veloper need not have governmental approval to proceed with a
project before a party adversely affected may seek relief via de-
claratory judgment.3 2 In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the
developer had met with members of the subdivision and "'indi-
cated that he intended to commercially develop the properties at
issue.""33 The dispute over the application of the covenant was
also clearly defined in correspondence between the parties.'
The developer also argued that the result of the trial court's de-
cision was to allow no use of the lots for anything other than open
124. Id. at 266, 591 S.E.2d at 685.
125. Id. at 269, 591 S.E.2d at 687.
126. Id. at 265, 591 S.E.2d at 684.
127. Id. at 267, 591 S.E.2d at 686.
128. Id., 591 S.E.2d at 685.
129. 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E.2d 773 (1964).
130. River Heights, 267 Va. at 267, 591 S.E.2d at 686.
131. Id. at 268, 591 S.E.2d at 686 (alteration in original).
132. Id. (citing Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. Mill Two Assoc. P'ship, 259 Va. 685, 529
S.E.2d 318 (2000); Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d
407 (1984)).
133. Id. at 269, 591 S.E.2d at 687.
134. Id.
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space, "resulting in a serious diminution in the value of the
lots."135 The court noted, however, that "the effect on the value of
property resulting from the enforcement or a refusal to enforce a
restrictive covenant 'is of slight if any consequence.""36 The court
held that the developer "had at least constructive notice from the
record chain of title of both the restrictive covenant that prohibits
commercial use of his property and the plat note that denies Lots
2C and 2D access to Route 29 if developed residentially."'37
Finally, the developer alleged that a change of conditions in
Route 29 had destroyed the essential object and purpose of the
restriction. 3 ' However, this case is readily distinguishable from
the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision in Chesterfield
Meadows Shopping Center Associates, L.P. v. Smith.'39 In his
analysis, the developer looked myopically at how the radical
change along the Route 29 corridor had affected only his par-
cels. 4 ° The court reasoned that the appropriate analysis should
be of the property in and around the neighborhood to determine
whether the purpose of the restrictive covenant is destroyed.' In
this case, it is clear that there had not been a radical change in
the use of the balance of the subdivision.'42 The restrictive cove-
nant still served its intended purpose-to protect the lots in the
particular subdivision from commercial uses.4 3 The conditions ex-
isting within the subdivision must be examined along with those
existing in the surrounding area in order to determine the issue
fairly. 4
In Barner v. Chappell,'45 the court considered whether the cur-
rent owners of lots within a subdivision could enforce a restrictive
covenant recorded by the original developer against one of the
lots. '4 In this case, the original landowner, Governor John Pol-
135. Id. at 272, 591 S.E.2d at 689.
136. Id. (citing Booker v. Old Dominion Land Co., 188 Va. 143, 152, 49 S.E.2d 314, 319
(1948).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 273-74, 591 S.E.2d at 689.
139. 264 Va. 350, 568 S.E.2d 676 (2002).
140. River Heights, 267 Va. at 274-75, 591 S.E.2d at 690.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 275, 591 S.E.2d at 690.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 266 Va. 277, 585 S.E.2d 590 (2003).
146. Id. at 279, 585 S.E.2d at 591.
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lard, had recorded a subdivision plat, creating lots designated by
number or letter, access roads, a park, and an undivided, unnum-
bered remainder parcel.'47 In the deed from Governor Pollard to
Craighill for Lot 8 of the subdivision, Governor Pollard inserted a
restriction that Lot 8 was to be used in connection with the adja-
cent Lot A and that "'no house, garage or structure of any kind
shall be erected thereon.'"" At the time of the conveyance,
Craighill also owned Lot A.'49 The deeds from Governor Pollard
for the balance of the lots in the subdivision, as well as for the
unnumbered, undivided parcel, indicated an intention to develop
the property under like restrictions. 0
Following Governor Pollard's death, his estate subdivided the
undivided parcel into two lots which were conveyed to third par-
ties.'5 ' Some years later, the Barners acquired Lot 8 without the
benefit of a title examination and unaware of the restriction
against development.'52 When the Barners began construction of
a single family residence on Lot 8, a number of residents within
Pollard Park filed a bill of complaint, seeking to enforce the re-
strictions in the original Pollard-Craighill deed.'53 At trial, testi-
mony given on behalf of the Barners indicated that the reason for
the restriction was to assure that a proposed sanitary sewer line
serving the subdivision could be run through Lot 8.1" In response,
the Barners testified that they were willing to re-route the sewer
line around their proposed residence.'55 The neighboring land-
owners contended that Pollard could have just as easily routed
the sewer line along the edge of Lot 8, suggesting that his true in-
tent was to reserve Lot 8 as perpetual open space.5 6
In considering this case on the enforceability of a restrictive
covenant, the court stated that "[a] restrictive covenant is en-
forceable if a landowner establishes: (1) horizontal privity; (2)
vertical privity; (3) intent for the restriction to run with the land;
147. Id. at 280, 585 S.E.2d at 591-92.
148. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 592.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 281, 585 S.E.2d at 592.
151. Id.
152. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 592-93.
153. Id. at 282, 585 S.E.2d at 593.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 282-83, 585 S.E.2d at 593.
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(4) that the restriction touches and concerns the land; and (5) that
the covenant is in writing."'57 The only requirement at issue in
the appeal to the supreme court was whether any of the neighbor-
ing landowners could establish vertical privity and whether the
chancellor erred in finding that the purpose of the restrictive
covenant had not lapsed.'58
The court noted that "[v]ertical privity requires that the benefit
of a restrictive covenant extend only to 'one who succeeds to some
interest of the beneficiary in the land respecting the use of which
the promise was made.""59 Most of the owners within Pollard
Park traced their ownership through chains of title to convey-
ances from Pollard that predated the Pollard-Craighill deed. 6 °
Consequently, there was no vertical privity for these owners.'61
There was no express intention to extend the benefit of the cove-
nant directly to third parties.'62 By contrast, some of the other
owners traced their ownership to original grantees from Governor
Pollard whose deeds were executed after the execution of the Pol-
lard-Craighill deed.16 Consequently, they met the requirements
for vertical privity."4
Moving from the issue of vertical privity, the court next consid-
ered whether the purpose of the restriction no longer existed un-
der the tests articulated in Smith v. Chesterfield Meadows Shop-
ping Center Associates, L.P. 165 and Booker v. Old Dominion Land
Co.,66 both of which provided that a party seeking to establish
that the purpose of a restriction no longer exists bears a heavy
burden.'67 The court went on to hold that the neighboring land-
157. Id. at 283, 585 S.E.2d at 594 (citing Waynesboro Vill., L.L.C. v. BMC Props., 255
Va. 75, 81, 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998); Sloan v. Johnson, 254 Va. 271, 276, 491 S.E.2d 725,
728 (1997)).
158. Id. at 284, 585 S.E.2d at 594.
159. Id. (quoting Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 215
Va. 658, 663, 212 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (1975)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 259 Va. 82, 84, 523 S.E.2d 834, 835 (2000). For a further discussion of the case and
the rules of law enunciated therein, see Brian R. Marron & Christopher M. Gill, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Real Estate Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 223, 238-39 (2003) (discuss-
ing the second appeal of the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia).
166. 188 Va. 143, 148, 49 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1948).
167. Barner, 266 Va. at 285, 585 S.E.2d at 595.
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owners presented sufficient evidence to support the theory that
the covenant on Lot 8 was intended to assure that it would re-
main an open area within the subdivision.'68
C. Title to Property
In Harrison-Wyatt, L.L.C. v. Ratliff,'69 the court considered
whether the ownership of coal bed methane ("CBM") was the
property of the owners of the surface land or the owners of the
coal beneath the land's surface. 7 ° In this case, the coal rights
were conveyed by deed stating that the grantee would own all the
coal in, upon, and underlying the tracts of land at issue.17" ' The
lynchpin question in this case was whether CBM was a portion of
the coal conveyed.'72 After examining the plain language of the
deed, the science of how coal and CBM are formed, and the lexi-
cology of the term "coal," the lower court concluded that there was
an insufficient bond or association between CBM and coal to con-
clude that they were one and the same.'73 The trial court ruled
that CBM "'is simply a by-product of coal' and a severable es-
tate.' 74
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that this was a
case of first impression in Virginia. 7 ' In rendering its decision,
the court reviewed cases on this subject from Pennsylvania,'76
Alabama,'77 Montana, 7 8 Wyoming, 79 and West Virginia.8 ° The
court also considered Amoco Products Co. v. Southern Ute Indian
Tribe,'' in which the Supreme Court of the United States consid-
ered this issue in the context of reservation lands restored to the
168. Id. at 286, 585 S.E.2d at 595.
169. 267 Va. 549, 593 S.E.2d 234 (2004).
170. Id. at 550, 593 S.E.2d at 235.
171. Id. at 551, 593 S.E.2d at 235.
172. Id. at 551-52, 593 S.E.2d at 235-36.
173. Id. at 553, 593 S.E.2d at 236.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
177. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212 (Ala. 1993).
178. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1995).
179. Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 542 (Wyo. 2002).
180. Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 2003).
181. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
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Ute Indian Tribes. In Amoco, the Court rejected the tribe's claim
to the CBM, relying in part on the common conception of coal at
the time of the litigation: that coal was the "'solid rock substance'
used as fuel."182 At that time, coal would not have encompassed
CBM because it was a gas rather than a solid material and be-
cause it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from
coal as the coal was mined, rather than as a part of the coal it-
self.'83 Relying upon the foregoing precedent, the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the lower court's ruling."&
In the case of Jones v. Hill,"8 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered
whether a lien may attach to the vested interest of a remainderman
who takes from a life tenant with full power to dispose of the entire
corpus of the estate, and whether a creditor may enforce the lien af-
ter the death of the life tenant, when the remainderman predeceases
the life tenant.
186
In this case, the decedent, Thomas Jones, left to his wife, Annie
Jones, "'all of my real and personal estate for life, and, having full
confidence in her, I authorize her to use and consume so much of
the income, corpus and principle of my estate as she, in her sole
discretion, deems necessary for her comfort, maintenance, welfare
and support. 1 87 The will further provided that, "'[a]t my wife's
death, I give, devise, and bequeath that all my property, real and
personal, be equally divided between all my children.""8 8 Among
the children was Vaiden Jones,8 9 who survived his father but
predeceased his mother. 9 °
When Annie Jones died, the surviving children of Annie and
Thomas Jones sold a parcel of property in Brunswick County in
order to divide the proceeds equally as instructed in the will of
Thomas Jones.' 9 ' Tammie Hill ("Hill") had previously obtained a
182. Id. at 871.
183. See Harrison-Wyatt, 267 Va. at 556, 593 S.E.2d at 238.
184. Id. at 557, 593 S.E.2d at 238.
185. 267 Va. 708, 594 S.E.2d 913 (2004).
186. Id. at 709, 594 S.E.2d at 913.
187. Id. at 710, 594 S.E.2d at 914.
188. Id. (alteration in original).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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judgment in the amount of $10,000 against Vaiden Jones, and
"sought to enforce her lien against the proceeds of the sale." 192
The trial court held that the interest of Vaiden Jones in the real
property "'was a vested interest against which the judgment lien
of Tammie Hill attached and accordingly Tammie L. Hill is enti-
tled to the funds in dispute."'1 93
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the trial court's
characterization of Vaiden Jones' interest as a vested remainder
subject to divestment. 194 The court applied the "early vesting rule"
by which, absent an expression of intent to the contrary, a re-
mainderman will be held to be vested in interest immediately
upon the death of the testator, rather than contingent upon fu-
ture events.
195
The court was not persuaded by the Jones siblings' argument
that the interest was not vested because the mother had the right
to dispose of the property during her life. 196 The court held that
the interest vested and could have been divested by such an
event, but was not.' 97 As stated by the court:
Vested interests in land may be sold or inherited. When Vaiden
Jones died, his vested interest passed to Virginia Jones, his wife.
However, her inheritance of Vaiden Jones's remainder interest in the
parcel before the death of Annie Jones did not destroy Hill's lien be-
cause a lien attaches to property, not to the person against whom
judgment is awarded. 198
In the case of Maitland v. Allen, 99 Barbara Maitland ("Mait-
land"), formerly Barbara Allen, and her husband Wilbert C. Allen
("Allen") "executed five deeds of gift in 1997 conveying separate
parcels of land to each of their five adult children" and "re-
serv[ing] a joint life estate for Maitland and Allen in the parcels
conveyed."2"' Maitland and Allen later divorced, and Maitland
sought to compel partition of the land previously conveyed to the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 711, 594 S.E.2d at 914 (citing FREDERICK D.G. RIBBLE, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 713, at 932 (2d ed. 1928)).
195. Id. (citing French v. Logan, 108 Va. 67, 69, 60 S.E. 622, 623 (1908)).
196. See id.
197. Id. at 712, 594 S.E.2d at 915.
198. Id. (citing Hardy v. Norfolk Mfg. Co., 80 Va. 404, 418 (1885)).
199. 267 Va. 714, 594 S.E.2d 918 (2004).
200. Id. at 715-16, 594 S.E.2d at 919.
[Vol. 39:357
REAL ESTATE AND LAND USE LAW
children.21 Allen and the children argued that Maitland was
barred from partitioning the parcels as a life tenant.2 2 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered this case in two parts: first,
whether the life tenant could partition the parcels as to the re-
maindermen; and second, whether the life estates could be parti-
tioned.20 3
'The right to partition jointly held real property arises under
Virginia Code section 8.01-81.214 The statute does not explicitly
authorize a life tenant to compel partition.2 5 While Maitland was
a tenant in common with Allen as to the life estate, she was not a
tenant in common with the remaindermen. 216 "'In order for a life
tenant to be a tenant in common with other owners of the prop-
erty there must be coequal rights of occupancy.' 20 7 Such rights
were not present in this case. "By definition, the holder of a pre-
sent life estate and the holder of a future remainder interest do
not own concurrent interests because each holder uses the prop-
erty exclusively during her respective time of possession."20 ' The
court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting
summary judgment to the children. 2 9 The case was remanded for
"further proceedings as may be required to complete the cause
with regard to the partition among the joint life tenants, Allen
and Maitland."2 10
In Perel v. Brannan,1 the Richmond City Circuit Court was
asked to construe a declaration of restrictions recorded against
the River Locke subdivision (the "Declaration").212 The Declara-
tion, among other things, placed restrictions on the permissible
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 716, 718, 594 S.E.2d at 919-20.
204. Virginia Code section 8.01-81 states, in pertinent part, that "[tienants in common,
joint tenants, executors with the power to sell, and coparceners of real property.., shall be
compellable to make partition and may compel partition." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-81 (Repl.
Vol. 2000).
205. Maitland, 267 Va. at 716, 594 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Whitby v. Overton, 243 Va.
20, 22, 413 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1992)).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Whitby, 243 Va. at 24, 413 S.E.2d at 44).
208. Id. at 718, 594 S.E.2d at 920 (quoting Beach v. Beach, 74 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo. 2003)).
209. Id. at 718-19, 594 S.E.2d at 920-21.
210. Id.
211. 267 Va. 691, 594 S.E.2d 899 (2004).
212. Id. at 697, 594 S.E.2d at 903.
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location and type of buildings allowed in the subdivision, required
that plans and specifications for improvements were to be re-
viewed by an architectural review committee ("ARC"), and further
required that no construction could occur within buffers, set-
backs, or "no building areas."213 The defendant, Brannan, pur-
chased a lot in the subdivision and received approval from the
ARC for the site and landscaping plans for his proposed im-
provements.214 Shortly after the approval, the Brannans began to
develop the lot by removing trees, excavating for foundations, and
constructing a retaining wall.21 Perel and others filed a bill of
complaint alleging that the porch and retaining wall encroached
in the setback area and that the excavation and removal of vege-
tation, including eight mature trees, violated the buffer sections
of the covenants.216 Perel also asked the court to order the decla-
rant under the Declaration, Locke Lane, to enforce the covenants
against the Brannans."7
Following a bench trial, the circuit court found that the
Brannans had violated the covenants by removing the trees and
vegetation in the buffer area and by building in the setback
area.21 ' The court found, however, that the Brannans' excavation
and construction of the retaining wall did not violate the cove-
nants.219 "The trial court denied both parties' requests for attor-
neys' fees; ordered the Brannans to replace the vegetation that
had been removed, except for the eight large trees... ; and or-
dered the Brannans to remove the patio and any other improve-
ments in the setback area."22 ° The parties filed cross-appeals.221
The Supreme Court of Virginia first considered the issue of the
retaining wall. The lower court held, essentially, that the neces-
sity of the retaining wall to hold back the excavated soil was an
exception to the restrictions prohibiting development in the set-
back area.222 The lower court also had noted that "'there [was] no
213. Id. at 696, 594 S.E.2d at 902.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 697, 594 S.E.2d at 902.
216. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 903.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 698, 594 S.E.2d at 903.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 699, 594 S.E.2d at 904.
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evidence on which the court could prepare an enforceable order
that the excavated area be returned to its pre-excavation state'
implying that even if the retaining wall was a violation of the
covenants, the trial court would not order removal of the wall."223
The supreme court reviewed the Declaration and concluded that
walls were absent from the list of permitted structures and im-
provements within the setback area and that the retaining wall
clearly violated the covenants. 224 The court noted, however, that
the establishment of this breach of the covenants would not
automatically entitle Perel to injunctive relief or specific perform-
ance.225 The court declared that
[a] defendant may avoid imposition of the remedy requested if such a
remedy would create a hardship or injustice that is out of proportion
to the relief sought .... However, on the questions of hardship, in-
justice, or impossibility, the defendant bears the burden of proving
the elements of the defense.
226
The defendant must show, beyond simply the level of inconven-
ience, that the hardship or injustice is out of proportion to the re-
lief sought.227 "Impossibility is also a defense to specific perform-
ance or injunctive relief requested .... even when the defendant
'intentionally rendered himself unable to perform.' 28 The court
concluded that the retaining wall did violate the covenant and
that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for further
evidentiary proceedings in accordance with proof requirements to
determine whether the Brannans were entitled to one of the fore-
going defenses against the injunction.229
On the issue of tree removal, the court undertook a similar
analysis. The Brannans violated the covenants by removing the
80- to 100-foot trees from the buffer zone, notwithstanding the
ARC's approval of the Brannans' plans. 2 0 The ARC's discretion
223. Id.
224. Id. at 699, 594 S.E.2d at 904.
225. Id. at 699-700, 594 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Sonoma Dev., Inc. v. Miller, 258 Va. 163,
167-69, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579-81 (1999); Mid-State Equip. Co. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225
S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976)).
226. Id. at 700, 594 S.E.2d at 904-05 (citing Harper v. Virginian Ry., 86 S.E. 919, 922
(W. Va. 1915)).
227. Id. at 701, 594 S.E.2d at 905.
228. Id. (quoting Jones v. Tunis, 99 Va. 220, 222, 37 S.E. 841, 841 (1901)).
229. Id. at 706-07, 594 S.E.2d at 908.
230. Id. at 702, 594 S.E.2d at 906.
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did not extend to the express provisions of the Declaration forbid-
ding such removal.231 The court similarly remanded this portion
of the decision to the trial court to determine whether the
Brannans could show undue hardship, injustice, impossibility, or
difficulty of replacing the trees.232
The supreme court agreed with the lower court's determination
that Perel's claim against the developer/declarant should be dis-
missed.233 Perel's claim was rooted in language in the Declaration
giving the developer "the power to levy assessments against a
property owner for failure to clean and paint the exterior of the
house; failure to maintain the landscape," and other matters.234
The court reasoned that having the right to enforce these re-
quirements "is not the equivalent of having a duty to enforce the
covenants against a violator."23
D. Easements and Rights-of-Way
In Virginia v. Hicks,236 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered certain constitutional issues relating to a trespassing
policy adopted by the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Au-
thority ("RRHA") in the Whitcomb Court housing project. 7 Spe-
cifically, the Richmond City Council conveyed the public streets
within Whitcomb Court to RRHA, and RRHA "enacted a policy
authorizing the Richmond Police 'to serve notice ... to any person
who is found on [RRHA] property when such person.., cannot
demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for being on
the premises... and "'to arrest any person for trespassing after
such person, having been duly notified, either stays upon or re-
turns to [RRHA] property.' 23 The purpose of this policy was to
provide to the Richmond City Police an additional weapon in
231. Id.
232. Id. at 702-03, 594 S.E.2d at 906.
233. Id. at 703, 594 S.E.2d at 906.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
237. Id. at 115.
238. Id. at 116.
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fighting the open-air drug market that had been prevalent in this
housing project.2 39
After being arrested and convicted for trespassing under this
policy, the defendant, Hicks, attacked the arrest on constitutional
grounds, claiming that the regulations violated free speech rights
and could have a chilling effect on protected speech, such as leaf-
leting and demonstrating.141 The Court of Appeals of Virginia va-
cated his conviction, and the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed.2 4' The Supreme Court of Virginia found the trespass
policy unconstitutionally overbroad and in violation of the First
Amendment.2 4
2
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Virginia and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings.243 The Supreme Court found it important that
both the notice-barment rule and legitimate purpose or social
purpose rule apply to all persons using the streets of Whitcomb
Court, not just those who seek to engage in expression.244 The
court observed that "[elven assuming invalidity of the 'unwritten'
rule that requires leafleters and demonstrators to obtain advance
permission" from the manager, the defendant had not shown that
the RRHA policy, "as a whole prohibits a 'substantial' amount of
protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applica-
tions."2 4' The court also remarked that the enforcement of the
RRHA policy in a manner that violates the First Amendment
could still be remedied through case-by-case litigation, "but the
Virginia Supreme Court should not have used the 'strong medi-
cine' of overbreadth to invalidate the entire RRHA trespass pol-
icy.,246
In Barter Foundation, Inc. v. Widener,2 47 the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered "the rights of owners of land with respect to
an adjoining undeveloped parcel that was dedicated for use as a
239. See id. at 115.
240. Id. at 117, 121.
241. Id. at 117-18.
242. Id. at 118.
243. Id. at 124.
244. Id. at 123.
245. Id. at 123-24.
246. Id. at 124.
247. 267 Va. 80, 592 S.E.2d 56 (2004).
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public street in 1944, but which has never been formally accepted
by the governing public authority."2" In this case, the Barter
Foundation, Inc. ("Barter") became the owner of property lying
immediately to the west of the platted street, and Gordon L.
Widener ("Widener") was the owner of a lot lying to the east of
the platted street.249 Various plats and deeds in the chain of title
referred to this platted street as "25' street undeveloped" and re-
ferred to it as a public street.250 At no time, however, had the local
jurisdiction accepted this dedication.251
Widener sought permission from the town to remove stumps
and mow the right-of-way so that he could have access to his
property through it. 252 Barter filed an amended bill of complaint
against Widener and the town seeking a determination that the
dedication of the right-of-way had been abrogated through lack of
use by the public and, as a result, Barter, as successor to the
dedicator, was "'the owner of the real property free and clear of
the proposed easement.' 253 Widener answered the bill of com-
plaint by alleging that "Barter could not claim ownership of the
disputed property because it was estopped to do so by language in
the deeds in its chain of title.254
At trial, the chancellor found that the town had not accepted
the dedication of the right-of-way. 255 The chancellor also found,
however, that "'a public right of way or easement... exists sepa-
rately and independently from whether the Town has accepted
the dedication' and, thus, 'the Wideners and... other members of
the public have and own a right of way or easement to travel
across and use the said 25 foot [wide] street as a public way. "'256
The Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed this case by reiterat-
ing the law of dedication as it has evolved.257 The court explained
that
248. Id. at 83, 592 S.E.2d at 57.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 87-88, 592 S.E.2d at 59.
252. Id. at 86, 592 S.E.2d at 58-59.
253. Id. at 86-87, 592 S.E.2d at 59.
254. Id. at 87, 592 S.E.2d at 59.
255. Id. at 87-88, 592 S.E.2d at 59.
256. Id. (alteration in original).
257. Id. at 88-91, 592 S.E.2d at 60-62.
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[biecause a definite and certain grantee was required in order to take
land by conveyance or grant at common law, a landowner could not
effectively convey or grant an interest in his land to the general pub-
lic as grantee. However, in order to facilitate the creation of public
streets and other public areas for the benefit of the general public,
the doctrine of dedication evolved and recognized the rights acquired
by the public by estopping the dedicator from disputing those
rights."
The court also cited the common law rule that "[ulntil the public
accepted the dedication, it was a mere offer to dedicate."'2 9 The
court further explained:
Prior to acceptance, the offer to dedicate imposed no responsibilities
upon the public and was subject to unilateral withdrawal at any time
by the landowner. Acceptance could be formal and express.., or by
implication arising from an exercise of dominion by the governing
authority or from long continued public use .... 260
Later legislative schemes noted that the recordation of a properly
approved subdivision plat "operated 'to create a public easement
or right of passage over streets shown on the plat."'261 "'The rights
of the public,"' however, "'were merely inchoate, and... the dedi-
cation was not complete until accepted by competent public au-
thority."'2
62
The court agreed with the chancellor's finding that the town
had not formally accepted the dedication of the street.263 The level
of conduct that would rise to implied acceptance on the part of the
governing body, such as paving streets or installing public utili-
ties, had not been met.2" Consequently, there was no implied
dedication by the town.265
The court next considered whether a right-of-way was created
in favor of the public, even in the absence of the acceptance of
258. Id. at 88-89, 592 S.E.2d at 60 (citing Payne v. Godwin, 147 Va. 1019, 1024-25, 133
S.E. 481,482-83 (1926)).
259. Id. at 89, 592 S.E.2d at 60 (quoting Brown v. Moore, 255 Va. 523, 529, 500 S.E.2d
797, 800 (1998)).
260. Id. (quoting Brown v. Tazewell County Water & Sewerage Auth., 226 Va. 125,
129-30, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983)).
261. Id. (quoting Brown, 226 Va. At 130, 306 S.E.2d at 891).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 91, 592 S.E.2d at 61.
264. Id. at 90-91, 592 S.E.2d at 61.
265. Id. at 91, 592 S.E.2d at 61.
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dedication by the town. 266 The court agreed that such right did ex-
ist.267 Although the town did not assume the obligation of mainte-
nance or potential liability by accepting the dedication, under
common law "the general public could accept the dedication by
use of the right of passage granted by the dedicator."2 68 Moreover,
because the evidence in the case suggested that the public had
used the right-of-way and that the town agreed with Widener
that he could conduct the requested improvement and mainte-
nance of the area, Barter could not meet its substantial burden of
showing that the town had abandoned the right-of-way.269
E. Landlord and Tenant
O'Neill v. Windshire-Copeland Associates, L.P.,27° the plaintiff
brought an action for personal injuries sustained when she fell off
the balcony of an apartment building owned by the defendant.2"1
The protective railing on the balcony did not comply with height
requirements of the local municipal building code.272 The evidence
also showed, however, that the plaintiff "was familiar with the
balcony and that she had consumed alcohol prior to the acci-
dent."2 73
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia held that the defendant was negligent per se because of
the balcony deficiency. 4 The lower court, however, also held that
the negligence per se finding "did not bar its defense of contribu-
tory negligence" arising out of the plaintiffs alcohol consump-
tion. 5 When the case was submitted to the jury, the jury found
the plaintiff contributorily negligent, and the court entered a
judgment in favor of the defendant.7 6 The plaintiff appealed the
case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
266. Id. at 91-92, 592 S.E.2d at 61-62.
267. Id. at 91, 592 S.E.2d at 61.
268. Id., 592 S.E.2d at 62.
269. Id. at 93, 592 S.E.2d at 63.
270. 267 Va. 605, 595 S.E.2d 281 (2004).
271. 267 Va. at 607, 595 S.E.2d at 282 (2004).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 607-08, 595 S.E.2d at 282.
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Upon request of the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia exercised its certification jurisdiction277 to answer the ques-
tion of whether the defense of contributory negligence was still
available, given the defendant's negligence per se.2
The Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed this question by focus-
ing first on whether Virginia had adopted section 483 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, which provides that "when a defen-
dant's negligence consists of a violation of a statute, a plaintiffs
contributory negligence bars his recovery for injuries caused by
the negligence of the defendant 'unless the effect of the statute is
to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred
upon the defendant."'279 This occurs when the statute "'is enacted
in order to protect a certain class of persons against their own in-
ability to protect themselves,' ' 2s° even if such persons are "'fully
able to protect themselves.''
The plaintiff argued that the case of Carter Coal Co. v. Bates28
2
was the controlling authority in Virginia for rejecting the as-
sumption of risk defense.28 3 The court observed that Carter Coal
"involved a coal company's failure to provide for a 'conspicuous
light' on the front and rear of coal hauling machinery as required
by statute. ",2 ' The court's decision in that case was based on the
principle that, "if the mining-safety legislation at issue had not
abrogated this common law defense, the 'systematic violation' of
the statute through the purported risk-assumption by the plain-
tiff would defeat the statute's purpose."285
277. See VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5.42 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
278. O'Neill, 267 Va. at 606-07, 595 S.E.2d at 281.
279. Id. at 608, 595 S.E.2d 282 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483
(1965)).
280. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965)).
281. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. d (1965)).
282. Carter Coal Co. v. Bates, 127 Va. 586, 105 S.E.2d at 76 (1920).
283. O'Neill, 267 Va. at 608-09, 595 S.E.2d at 282-83.
284. O'Neill, 267 Va. at 609, 595 S.E.2d at 282.
285. Id. (construing Carter Coal Co. v. Bates, 127 Va. 586, 105 S.E. 76 (1920)). The
court also cited Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Bell, 149 Va. 720, 141 S.E. 838 (1928) for the
proposition that:
if the employer may avail himself of the defense that the employee agreed in
advance that the statute should be disregarded, the court would be measuring
the rights of the persons whom the law makers intended to protect by the
common law standard of the reasonably prudent person, and not by the defi-
nite standard set up by the legislature. This would be practically a judicial
20041
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The court also found the assumption of risk analogy inapposite
in this case. The court stated that assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence stand in a different legal relation to the vio-
lation of a statute.2"6 "'Assumption of risk imports no delict on the
part of an employe [e]. ... Contributory negligence... is a delict
or neglect of duty by the employe[e], and hence he cannot recover
for the delict of the employer,.... if his own delict has contributed
to his injury as a proximate cause."'28 7 The court recognized that
legislative intent may be to allocate liability specifically to defen-
dants in some cases, such as in the case of common carriers.2 8
Nothing in the applicable building code, however, would suggest a
legislative intent to fully allocate liability in the face of contribu-
tory negligence.28 9 Consequently, the supreme court determined
that the finding of contributory negligence should stand and bar
the plaintiffs recovery.29°
In the case of Video Zone, Inc. v. KF&F Properties, L.C.,291 the
Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted language in a lease to de-
termine whether the landlord or tenant should bear the cost of
maintaining and/or replacing heating ventilation and air condi-
tioning ("HVAC") equipment.292 A portion of the HVAC equipment
was installed within the premises with a "major component" of
the system located outside the premises on the roof.2 93 The lease
contained typical maintenance allocation language, requiring the
tenant to maintain the interior of the premises and the landlord
to maintain the roof, structure, and exterior.2 94 The lower court
determined that the lease language was ambiguous and that the
conduct of the parties surrounding the repair suggested that the
tenant, Video Zone, had agreed to bear the cost of the repair.295
repeal of the act.
O'Neill, 267 Va. at 609, 595 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Atlantic Coast, 149 Va. At 755, 141 S.E.
at 842).
286. O'Neill, 267 Va. at 609-10, 595 S.E.2d at 283.
287. Id. at 610, 595 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co. v. John-
son, 244 F. 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1917)) (alteration in original).
288. Id., 595 S.E.2d at 283-84.
289. Id. at 610-11, 595 S.E.2d at 284.
290. Id. at 611, 595 S.E.2d at 284.
291. 267 Va. 621, 594 S.E.2d*921 (2004).
292. Id. at 625-28, 594 S.E.2d at 923-25.
293. Id. at 623, 594 S.E.2d at 922.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 624, 594 S.E.2d at 923.
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Because the determination of ambiguity is one of law, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia examined this question de novo.296 In so
doing, the supreme court agreed that the lease language was am-
biguous, because it could be understood in more than one way
when the words in the lease were interpreted in their usual, ordi-
nary, and popular meaning.2 97 Given the ambiguity, the court
agreed that parol evidence was relevant to discern the intent of
the parties-"not to contradict or vary contract terms, but to es-
tablish the real contract between the parties."298 According to the
court, "the [parties' interpretation and dealings with regard to
the contract terms are entitled to great weight and will be fol-
lowed unless doing so would violate other legal principles."299 Be-
cause there was evidence to support the circuit court's factual
findings concerning the parties' intent, the supreme court af-
firmed the allocation. °°
F. Eminent Domain
In the case of East Tennessee Natural Gas Company v. Sage,"1
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was
asked to review a ruling by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia in which that court found that
the plaintiffs could exercise the right of eminent domain to ac-
quire necessary easements pursuant to the Natural Gas Act
("NGA") and should be granted an injunction, entitling the gas
company to immediate possession. 32 The NGA gives a gas com-
pany the power to acquire property by eminent domain, but the
296. Id. at 625, 594 S.E.2d at 923 (citing Utsch v. Utsch, 266 Va. 124, 129, 581 S.E.2d
507, 509 (2003); Pyramid Dev., L.L.C. v. D & J Assocs., 262 Va. 750, 754, 553 S.E.2d 725,
727 (2001); Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. Pierce Arrow, L.L.C., III, 258 Va. 524, 528, 521 S.E.2d
761, 763 (1999)).
297. Video Zone, 267 Va. at 625-26, 594 S.E.2d at 923-24 (citing Eure v. Norfolk Ship-
building & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 632, 561 S.E.2d 663, 668 (2002)).
298. Id. at 626, 594 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting Tuomala v. Regent Univ., 252 Va. 368, 374,
477 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996)).
299. Id. at 627, 594 S.E.2d at 924 (citing Donnelly v. Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 258 Va.
171, 186, 519 S.E.2d 133, 142 (1999); Federal Ins. Co. v. Starr Elec. Co., 242 Va. 459, 467,
410 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1991); Dart Drug Corp. v. Nicholakos, 221 Va. 989, 995, 277 S.E.2d
155, 158 (1981); First Nat'l Exch. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 115,
192 S.E. 764, 771 (1937)).
300. Id.
301. 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004).
302. Id. at 820.
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NGA does not provide for immediate possession, as in the so-
called "quick take" provisions of some statutes. °3 The central is-
sue on appeal was "whether a gas company [could] obtain imme-
diate possession," absent such a statutory grant, "through the eq-
uitable remedy of a preliminary injunction."30 4
In holding that a preliminary injunction was appropriate, the
lower court found that the standards required for a preliminary
injunction were met.305 "Among other things, the court found that
holding up 'the [gas line] project's completion until the compensa-
tion for the last parcel [was] determined' would result in an ex-
tended delay."3 6 While there would be financial harm to the gas
company, the relative harm to the property owners would be
slight "because they had the 'right to draw down the money [the
gas company had] deposited with the Court."'30 7 The court also
noted that the "'expeditious completion of the pipeline [was] in
the public interest."'3 8 The court determined that, although eq-
uity may not be used to create a new substantive right,3 9 "when a
substantive right exists, an equitable remedy may be fashioned to
give effect to that right if the prescribed legal remedies are in-
adequate."310 The district court first considered "whether [the gas
company] had a substantive right to condemn the landowners'
property."311 After reaching its conclusion, the court's order "gave
[the company] an interest in the landowners' property that could
be protected in equity if the conditions for granting equitable...
relief were satisfied."31 2 The company had to demonstrate that it
would have suffered irreparable harm without the remedy and
that the harm would have been greater than that suffered by the
property owners. 3  In this case, the company "was awarded pos-
303. Id. at 822.
304. Id. at 818.
305. Id. at 820 (citing Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Selig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th
Cir. 1977)).
306. Id.
307. Id.; see also Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890); Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d 1312, 1321 (4th Cir. 1983).
308. Sage, 361 F.3d at 820.
309. Id. at 823 (citing Northwest Bank of Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206-07
(1988)).
310. Id. at 823; see also Berdie v. Kurtz, 88 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1937); Am. Brake
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N.Y. Rys. Co., 293 F. 633, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1923).
311. Sage, 361 F.3d at 823.
312. Id. (citing Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. 202, 213-14 (1868)).
313. Id. at 825.
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session only after it engaged in five months of intensive litigation
that analyzed and determined its right to take and its right to
equitable relief."314 The court added that "courts of equity may go
to greater lengths to give 'relief in furtherance of the public inter-
est than they are accustomed to go when only private interests
are involved."'315 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
spent sixteen months evaluating the need for the project and ul-
timately concluded that it was "required by public convenience
and necessity."316 It was, therefore, appropriate for the district
court to weigh the public benefit of expeditious project construc-
tion in deciding that it could use its equitable power in this
case.
317
In the case of Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond,31 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered "whether this action for in-
verse condemnation is subject to the three-year statute of limita-
tions for an implied contract, Code § 8.01-246, or the five-year
limitations period for injury to property, Code § 8.01-243. "319 The
case arose out of damage incurred by an apartment developer be-
cause of a change in position over the vacation of streets between
two separate parcels of land. On February 22, 1999, the City of
Richmond adopted an ordinance vacating certain streets within a
proposed development owned by Richmeade.32' In April 1999, the
city reconsidered the ordinance and denied the request to vacate
the streets.322 On September 10, 2002, Richmeade filed an action
for inverse condemnation "seeking a declaration that the City's
actions constituted a 'taking and/or damaging' of its property and
property rights."323 The City filed a plea arguing that the claim
was time-barred under the statute of limitations for an implied
contract.324 Richmeade, in reply, argued that the five-year limita-
314. Id.
315. Id. at 826 (quoting Va. Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)); see
also United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194 (1939).
316. Sage, 361 F.3d at 827.
317. Id. at 830.
318. 267 Va. 598, 594 S.E.2d 606 (2004).
319. Id. at 600, 594 S.E.2d at 607.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
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tion for damage to property should apply.32 5 The trial court con-
cluded that "an action for inverse condemnation was subject to
the three-year statue of limitations and entered an order dismiss-
ing Richmeade's motion for judgment."326
Article 1, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution "confers on a
property owner a right to just compensation from the government
when the government takes or damages the owner's property."3 27
The court has long held that:
[A] landowner could enforce this right under a tort or contract theory
of recovery; however, because the sovereign was not liable for inju-
ries based on negligence, a landowner could waive recovery under
the tort theory and sue on the contract between the landowner and
the government that Article 1, Section 11 implies.
328
The court further noted that:
[Tlhis Court has consistently held that when the government fail[s]
to condemn private land taken for public purposes, the landowner's
recourse [is] to file an action for inverse condemnation based on the
implied contract between the government and the landowner. The
terms of that implied contract require the government to pay the
landowner "such amount as would have been awarded therefore, if
the property had been condemned under the eminent domain stat-
utes.
32
In denying Richmeade's theory that this was a taking or damag-
ing of property by the government, the court stated that:
[A]n action for inverse condemnation is an action seeking redress for
the government's action in limiting property rights the landowner
holds. In that regard, the act giving rise to the breach of implied con-
tract is not an act aimed at the property, but rather an act that lim-
its the landowner's ability to exercise his property rights without
paying the landowner for that limitation. The mere fact that the
measurement of that compensation may be based on a decline in the
325. Richmeade, 267 Va. at 600, 594 S.E.2d at 607-08; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B)
(Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
326. Richmeade, 267 Va. at 600, 594 S.E.2d at 608 (citing Prendergast v. N. Va. Reg'l
Park Auth., 227 Va. 190, 313 S.E.2d 399 (1984)).
327. Id. at 600-01, 594 S.E.2d at 608 (citing VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; State Hwy. &
Transp. Comm'r v. Linsly, 223 Va. 437, 443, 490, 290 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1982); Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Ricks, 146 Va. 10, 18, 135 S.E. 685, 688 (1926)).
328. Id. at 601, 594 S.E.2d at 608 (citing Nelson County v. Loving, 126 Va. 283, 299-
300, 101 S.E. 406, 411 (1919)).
329. Id. (citing Burns v. Bd. of Supervisors, 218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 825
(1977); Nelson County v. Coleman, 126 Va. 275, 279, 101 S.E. 413, 414 (1919)).
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value of the subject property does not make the action one for injury
to property.
330
G. Zoning and Land Use Planning
In the case of O'Brien v. Appomattox County,331 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia explored
the extent to which a county zoning ordinance could regulate the
use of biosolids on agriculturally zoned property. 3 2 "Biosolids are
the nutrient-rich organic materials resulting from the treatment
of domestic sewage in a waste water treatment facility" and "can
be applied to a farmer's field as a substitute for commercially
available fertilizer."333 Despite complaints of odors and the possi-
bility of harmful organic chemicals and pathogens in this mate-
rial, the land application of sewage sludge has been practiced in
the Commonwealth for many years. 4 The Virginia Department
of Health ("VDH"), in conjunction with the State Water Control
Board ("SWCB"), administers a permitting process that controls
the application of biosolids in the state.335
The Board of Supervisors of Appomattox County enacted an
ordinance creating an "Agricultural A-1 Intensive Farming Over-
lay District," in which the "application of biosolids would be
tightly regulated."338 Under the new Appomattox County ordi-
nance, the use of biosolids would be prohibited other than within
this new zoning district. 337 To be included within the overlay dis-
trict, a farmer would have to seek county approval.3 3 ' The Board
subsequently adopted a second ordinance to establish procedures
330. Richmeade, 267 Va. 603, 594 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Bd. of Supervisors of Prince Wil-
liam County v. Omni Homes, Inc., 253 Va. 59, 72, 481 S.E.2d 460, 467 (1997); City of
Lynchburg v. Peters, 156 Va. 40, 48-49, 157 S.E. 769, 772 (1931); Lambert v. City of Nor-
folk, 108 Va. 259, 265, 61 S.E. 776, 778 (1908)).
331. 293 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D. Va. 2003).
332. Id. at 661.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-164.5 (Repl. Vol. 2004); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-
585-620(A)(5) (2002). For a discussion of recent legislature developments regarding biosol-
ids see Benjamin A. Thorp IV & William K. Taggert, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Envi-
ronmental Law, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 203,206 (2004).
336. O'Brien, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 661.
337. Id.
338. Id.
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for monitoring biosolids. 339 The ordinance provided that it was the
intent of the Board to eliminate the application of biosolids if
permitted by the General Assembly or the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia."4 The plaintiffs, therefore, argued that they should not be
bound by the ordinance because it was preempted by state law.34'
"It is a fundamental principle of Virginia state law that 'local
ordinances must conform to and not be in conflict with the public
policy of the State as embodied in its statutes."'342 The court de-
termined that the plaintiffs could prove their state law preemp-
tion claim if they could "show that the Appomattox ordinances
preclude[d] the use of biosolids that [were] authorized by a valid
VDH permit."343 Although the General Assembly did pass Vir-
ginia Code section 62.1-44.19:3 to allow a city or town to "adopt
an ordinance that provides for testing and monitoring of the land
application of sewage sludge" to determine compliance of applica-
ble laws and regulations, this legislation did not authorize the lo-
cal jurisdiction to ban such practices where the application of
sludge would be authorized by a valid permit.34 The court found,
therefore, based on the text of the local ordinance, that the stan-
dards for application of the biosolids were more restrictive than
would be required under a VDH permit and were thus preempted
by state law and void and unenforceable.345
In the case of Glazebrook v. Board of Supervisors of Spotsylva-
nia County,346 the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed the degree
of specificity required in the published notice of a zoning case.4
The court examined the application of Virginia Code section 15.2-
2204(A) in the context of proposed amendments to the Spotsylva-
nia County Zoning Ordinance initiated by the county to stem the
rapid growth that the county had been experiencing in recent
339. Id. at 661-62.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 662.
342. Id. (quoting Blanton v. Amelia County, 261 Va. 55, 63, 540 S.E.2d 869, 873 (2001));
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.17 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
343. O'Brien, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 662-63 (citing Blanton, 261 Va. at 65, 540 S.E.2d at
874).
344. Id. at 663.
345. Id. at 664.
346. 266 Va. 550, 587 S.E.2d 589 (2003).
347. Id. at 552, 587 S.E.2d at 590.
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years.348 The advertisements published in the local newspaper
stated the time, date, and location of the hearing, listed the af-
fected zoning districts and the zoning ordinance section numbers
and titles, and stated that the hearing would "affect development
standards."349 Plaintiff Glazebrook and others brought suit
against the Board claiming that the Board had failed to publish
adequate notice of its proposed amendments."' Virginia Code sec-
tion 15.2-2204(A) requires that an advertisement contain a de-
scriptive summary of the proposed action." 1 If the notice failed to
meet the requirements of the code section, "the Board acted out-
side the authority granted by the General Assembly and the
amendments [to the ordinance were] void ab initio."352
In this case, the supreme court considered the plain meaning of
the phrase "descriptive summary."353 The court noted that the de-
scription should cover the main points of the proposed amend-
ment and accurately describe the proposed amendment.35 '4 The
court reasoned that:
[Tihe intent of the statute is to generate informed public participa-
tion by providing citizens with information about the content of the
proposed amendments and the forum for debate concerning those
amendments. There is no indication that the General Assembly ex-
pected affected citizens to engage in legal research in order to decide
whether to participate in the hearing or to decide what their inter-
ests may be in a proposed amendment.
355
While the court neither attempted to dictate exact language re-
quired of future notices, nor did it establish a bright-line rule, it
instead held that the term "development standards" was inade-
quate to describe the proposed action by the Board.356 Conse-
quently, the notice was also inadequate and the ordinances
348. Id. at 552, 587 S.E.2d at 590.
349. Id. at 552-53, 587 S.E.2d at 590.
350. Id. at 553, 587 S.E.2d at 591.
351. Id. at 554, 587 S.E.2d at 591; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(A) (Supp. 2004).
352. Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 554, 587 S.E.2d at 591 (citing City Council of the City of
Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assoc., 245 Va. 371, 378, 429 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1993)).
353. Id. at 554-55, 587 S.E.2d at 591.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 555, 587 S.E.2d at 592 (citing Lawrence Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals of Augusta, 229 Va. 568, 571, 331 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1985)).
356. Id. at 556-57, 587 S.E.2d at 593 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204 (Supp. 2004);
Potomac Greens Assoc., 245 Va. at 378, 429 S.E.2d at 228)).
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adopted were void ab initio.357
In the case of Board of Supervisors of Fairfax v. Robertson,"'
the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the application of the
"fairly debatable" test in the context of the county's refusal to
grant a special exception in exercise of its legislative authority. 9
The plaintiff, Robertson, owned a parcel of land adjacent to the
Dulles Airport Access Road ("DAAR"). 36 ° Property within 200 feet
of the DAAR is subject to a setback requirement limiting devel-
opment. 61 The setback ordinance allowed the Board of Supervi-
sors to deviate from the setback requirements under certain cir-
cumstances.362 The underlying zoning of the property would have
permitted three units per acre on the approximately 2.78-acre
parcel.363 The parties agreed that without the deviation, Robert-
son could only build one single-family dwelling on the property.364
Robertson filed a proffered condition amendment application
seeking a deviation to allow him to construct four single-family
dwelling units.36' The deviation application was denied by the
Planning Commission and by the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County at separate public hearings. 366 Robertson sought declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief from the Fairfax County Cir-
cuit Court.367 The circuit court determined that "Robertson had
met his 'twin burden of proving the proffered use of the property
was reasonable and the Board's rejection of his application was
unreasonable,"' holding that the Board's denial of Robertson's ap-
plication was arbitrary and capricious.368
Upon review of the circuit court decision, the Supreme Court of
Virginia noted that because the granting or denial of a special ex-
ception is a legislative function, a presumption of legislative va-
357. Id. at 557, 587 S.E.2d at 593.
358. 266 Va. 525, 587 S.E.2d 570 (2003).
359. Id. at 527, 557 S.E.2d at 572.
360. Id. at 528, 587 S.E.2d at 572.
361. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 573 (citing Fairfax County, Va., Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(1)
(A)).
362. Id. (citing Fairfax County, Va., Zoning Ordinance § 2-414(4)).
363. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 572.
364. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 573.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 528-29, 587 S.E.2d at 573.
367. Id. at 529, 587 S.E.2d at 573.
368. Id. at 531, 587 S.E.2d at 574-75.
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lidity attached to the Board's denial of Robertson's application.36 9
This presumption of validity remains with the legislative action
on review by the supreme court and is not overcome by the lower
court's determination of unreasonableness."' According to the
court, "'[1]egislative action is reasonable if the matter at issue is
fairly debatable."'371 That is to say, legislative action is reasonable
"'when the evidence in support of the opposing views would lead
objective and reasonable persons to reach different conclu-
sions.""" The only issue on appeal, therefore, was whether the
county had produced sufficient evidence of reasonableness to
make the Board's rejection of Robertson's request for a deviation
fairly debatable.373 Evidence elicited at trial indicated that it was
reasonable to believe that noise levels at the property likely
would exceed those levels articulated by the Fairfax County com-
prehensive plan.374 Litigation over a legislative determination by
a Board of Supervisors is not a "battle of experts" in which the
land owner need only be more believable than the county in his
argument; rather, if there is any evidence presented in favor of
the legislative action that is "sufficiently probative to make a
fairly debatable issue of the ... decision to deny," the county
must prevail.375
In the case of Treacy v. Newdunn Associates, L.L.P.,376 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
the application of state and federal wetlands laws to a man-made
ditch under an interstate highway. 7 In this case, defendant
Newdunn, without obtaining a permit from the Army Corps of
Engineers (the "Corps") or the Virginia State Water Control
369. Id. at 532, 587 S.E.2d at 575 (citing County of Lancaster v. Cowardin, 239 Va. 522,
525, 391 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1990); City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 511, 211 S.E.2d
56, 60 (1975)).
370. Id. (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34-35, 267 S.E.2d 100, 103
(1980)).
371. Id. (quoting Lerner, 221 Va. at 34, 267 S.E.2d at 102).
372. Id. (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40
(1975)).
373. See id. at 532-33, 587 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Snell Constr.
Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974)).
374. Id. at 534-35, 587 S.E.2d at 576-77.
375. Id. at 536, 587 S.E.2d at 577 (citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Stickley, 263 Va. 1, 11,
556 S.E.2d 748, 754 (2002)).
376. 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003). For further discussion of the case, see Thorp &
Taggart, supra note 335, at 210-11, 214.
377. Id. at 409.
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Board ("SWCB"), began ditching and draining wetlands on a
forty-three-acre property near Newport News, Virginia."' The
property contained wetlands, as defined by the Corps regulations.
However, the natural hydrologic connection to the nearest navi-
gable waterway had been cut off by the construction of Interstate
64; the only remaining connection was a man-made ditch.37 9 The
Corps brought a civil enforcement action in federal district court,
and the SWCB initiated its own enforcement action in state court
which was removed to federal court.8 ° The lower court ruled for
Newdunn in both cases, finding that the Corps lacked jurisdiction
over wetlands on the Newdunn property under the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") and that the jurisdictional reach of Virginia law was
merely coextensive with federal law.381
The court first turned to the jurisdictional issue of whether it
could rule on the enforcement action premised on Virginia law.38 2
Such a ruling could only be had if '"it appears that some substan-
tial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of
one of the ... state claims.' 38 3 Both the Virginia state statute and
the Federal Regulations share a scientific definition of wet-
lands.3"4 However, the lower court erred by confusing the scien-
tific definition of wetlands and a jurisdictional wetland.3 5 That
question turns not on the federal regulations, but rather the Vir-
ginia Wetland Resources Act of 2000.386 "The fact that a state law
might mimic the wording of the federal law," the court noted
"does not transform interpretation of the state statute into a fed-
eral question."38 7
378. Id. at 409-10.
379. Id.; see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002).
380. Newdunn, 344 F.3d at 410.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 410-11 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 13 (1983)).
384. Id. at 411 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3 (Cum.
Supp. 2004)).
385. Id. As the court noted, "the issue is not whether the Newdunn property contains
wetlands, but whether those wetlands are within the jurisdiction of the State Water Con-
trol Board." Id.
386. Id. (citing Virginia Wetlands Resources Act of 2000, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.3,
-44.5, -44.15, -44.15:5, -44.29 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum Supp. 2004)).
387. Id. at 411 n.2.
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The plain text of the Virginia Wetland Resources Act defines
state waters broadly to include "all water, on the surface and un-
der the ground, wholly or partially within or bordering the Com-
monwealth or within its jurisdiction including wetlands.""' The
Fourth Circuit added that, "[niothing in the Virginia Act refers to
the CWA's definition of 'navigable waters' or the 'waters of the
United States,"' upon which Federal jurisdiction rests. 89 The
plain language of the Virginia Act "makes it inconceivable that
the term 'wetlands,' as it is used in the state legislation, could
necessarily turn on the resolution of a question of federal law."39 °
Under Virginia's new wetlands regulations, impacts that may
have been permissible to isolated wetlands under federal regula-
tions will be limited in Virginia.39' Consequently, the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed this portion of the lower court's decision and re-
manded the state enforcement action to the Virginia court "from
which it was improperly removed."392
On the remaining question of federal law, the court cited
United States v. Deaton393 in finding that the man-made drainage
ditch could be classified as a "tributary" to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Corps.394 The court concluded that a broad interpretation of
the term "tributary" by the Corps was justified because dis-
charges into non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands
have a substantial effect on the water quality in navigable wa-
ters.395 "That the 1-64 ditch at issue in the present case was man-
made rather than a natural watercourse is an irrelevant distinc-
tion."396 Consequently, the ruling of the lower court was re-
versed.397
388. Id. at 412 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 412-13.
391. Id. at 414.
392. Id.
393. 332 F.3d 698, 711 (4th Cir. 2003). In Deaton, the Fourth Circuit observed that,
through the Clean Water Act regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers intends to assert
jurisdiction over "any branch of a tributory system that eventually flows into a navigable
body of water." Id.; see also Thorp & Taggart, supra note 335, at 213-14.
394. See Treacy, 344 F. 3d at 416.
395. Id. at 416-17.
396. Id. at 417.
397. Id.
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In Cochran v. Fairfax County Board of Zoning Appeals,398 the
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated three variance cases from
Fairfax County, Pulaski County, and the City of Virginia Beach
to provide a comprehensive discussion of the principles applicable
to the granting or denial of a variance.399 In the Fairfax County
case, the petitioner, who had lived in a dwelling on the subject
property for eight years, asked for four variances arising out of
his desire to enlarge and relocate the dwelling.4"' It was undis-
puted that the petitioner could have constructed the new dwelling
on the property by shifting the structure two feet to the south.4 1
The petitioner argued, however, that such a configuration would
provide less "curb appeal."40 2 Over the opposition of neighbors, the
Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") granted all four variances, con-
cluding that the denial of the variance "would result in practical
difficulty or unnecessary hardship that would deprive the user of
all reasonable use of the land and/or buildings involved."4 3 The
lower court affirmed the decision of the BZA and the adjacent
property owners and the county appealed.4 4
In the Pulaski County case, the petitioners, owners of a corner
lot, petitioned the BZA for a variance to reduce the side setback
requirement on the property to allow for construction of a ga-
rage.405 Although the topography of the lot was difficult, the ga-
rage could have been constructed closer to the house without the
need for a variance.40 6 However, this could only be done with ad-
ditional expense. 407 The BZA granted the petition, the lower court
affirmed the decision, and the neighboring property owners ap-
pealed.408
In the Virginia Beach case, the petitioners owned a parcel of
land upon which was constructed a home with a detached ga-
398. 267 Va. 756, 594 S.E.2d 571 (2004).
399. Id. at 759, 594 S.E.2d at 573.
400. Id. at 759-60, 594 S.E.2d at 573.
401. Id. at 760, 594 S.E.2d at 574.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 761, 594 S.E.2d at 574.
404. Id.
405. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 574-75.
406. Id. at 761-62, 594 S.E.2d at 574-75.
407. Id. at 762, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
408. Id.
[Vol. 39:357
REAL ESTATE AND LAND USE LAW
rage. 40 9 Due to a modification in the zoning ordinance limiting the
total number of square feet of accessory structure, the garage was
a non-conforming structure.41" The applicants petitioned for a
variance to allow an additional structure on the property, specifi-
cally a storage shed.41' It is undisputed that the shed could have
been built in conformity with the ordinance if attached to the
house. Petitioners argued that their lot was so large that their
application was in keeping with the "spirit" of the ordinance.412
"The BZA granted the variance to bring the garage into confor-
mity, but denied the remainder of the... request on the ground
that no 'hardship' existed."41 The case was appealed to the circuit
court at which time the applicants all presented evidence of per-
sonal hardship, including that a family member had to move into
the house due to illness and that the storage shed was needed for
the storage of her belongings.4 4 The circuit court ruled that a
hardship existed and granted the variance. 4" The BZA thereafter
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.4 6
In discussing the three cases together, the Supreme Court of
Virginia emphasized the purpose of a variance-to soften the im-
pact of broad zoning ordinances when the strict application of
those ordinances, due to "the size, shape, topography or other
conditions," would render the property relatively useless.417 The
need for variances is borne of the constitutional argument that,
while a zoning ordinance may be a valid exercise of police power
on its face, it may be unconstitutional as applied to an individual
parcel. 4"8 According to the court, "'the language used in Code §
15.1-495(b) [now § 15.2-2309(2)] to define "unnecessary hardship"
clearly indicates that the General Assembly intended that vari-
ances be granted only in cases where application of zoning restric-
tions would appear to be constitutionally impermissible.'4 9 Be-
409. Id. at 762-63, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 763, 594 S.E.2d at 575.
412. Id.
413. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 576.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 763-64, 594 S.E.2d at 576.
416. Id. at 764, 594 S.E.2d at 576.
417. Id.
418. Id. (citing Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122, 267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980)).
419. Id. at 764, 594 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting Packer, 221 Va. at 122, 267 S.E.2d at 142)
(alteration in original).
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cause the BZA is acting in an administrative capacity in consider-
ing a variance, it may act "only in accordance with standards pre-
scribed by the legislative branch of government.42 ° Consequently,
before granting a variance, the BZA must find that the ordinance,
strictly applied, would effectively prohibit or unreasonably re-
strict the utilization of property such that the ordinance would in-
terfere with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken
as a whole.42' With those standards in mind, the court reasoned
that "[tihe proposed house in Fairfax could have been reconfig-
ured or moved" or the project abandoned and the current resi-
dence occupied; "[t]he proposed garage in Pulaski could have been
moved to another location" or abandoned; and "[t]he shed in Vir-
ginia Beach could have been built as an addition to the existing
house."422 "Without any variances, each of the properties retained
substantial beneficial uses and substantial value."423 While each
of the owners presented compelling reasons, none was legally
compelling.
In the case of USCOC of Virginia RSA No. 3 v. Montgomery
County Board of Supervisors,424 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a ruling by the lower court
that the denial of a special use permit by the Montgomery County
Board of Supervisors was not based upon substantial evidence in
violation of the Telecommunication Act.42 ' This case arose out of
an effort by USCOC of Virginia RSA No. 3 ("U.S. Cellular") to
erect a 240-foot telecommunications tower. "Because of its height
and location... the tower would be visible along the ridge line,
extending 170 feet above the tree canopy. "426 The county's com-
prehensive plan provided guidelines for the county's considera-
tion of new towers, for encouraging the use of preexisting towers,
for the use of monopole stealth towers in lieu of lattice-structures,
and for requiring that they be constructed in areas "'that will
provide the least negative impact to the citizens of each jurisdic-
420. Id. at 765, 594 S.E.2d at 576-77 (citing Gayton Triangle v. Henrico County, 216
Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570 (1976)).
421. Id. at 766, 594 S.E.2d at 577 (citing Commonwealth v. County Utilities Corp., 223
Va. 534, 542, 290 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1982)).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. 343 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2003).
425. Id. at 265; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i),
(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2000).
426. USCOCofVa., 343 F.3d at 265.
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tion.' 427 In addition, the county's comprehensive plan set forth a
"hierarchy of lands on which to construct new towers. '42' The
court noted that "[ridge line property zoned as agricultural or
conservation, such as the property at issue here, ranks as one of
the least preferred categories of land for the construction of tele-
communications towers."429 At the Board of Supervisors hearing,
the Board denied the application and instead granted permission
to construct a 195-foot tower that would not require lighting un-
der federal regulations. 4 0 According to a report conducted for the
county by an independent service, the coverage achieved by the
240-foot tower could not be matched by a single 195-foot tower,
but could be by several smaller towers.431
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
lower court that it was not the county's intent to prohibit service
in general.432 Rather, the county's granting of a special use permit
for the 195-foot tower that would provide wireless capabilities to
a significant area indicated "that the Board was not hostile to the
construction of new towers."433
The district court determined that the Board's rejection of the
240-foot tower was not based upon substantial evidence in a writ-
ten record as required by the Telecommunications Act. 4 The dis-
trict court had concluded that the Board's decision was based
solely upon aesthetic conditions in violation of Virginia law. 5
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with this analysis, distinguishing
the case of Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe.436
In that case, the court considered the validity of a local ordinance
that, among other things, required building applicants to submit
their plans to an architectural design review board for determina-
tion as to whether the designs were in good taste and in reason-
able harmony with the existing buildings in the surrounding ar-
427. Id. at 265-66.
428. Id. at 266.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 266-67.
432. See id. at 268.
433. Id. at 268-69.
434. USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Supervisors, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 817, 832 (W.D. Va. 2003).
435. USCOC of Va., 343 F.3d at 269 (citing Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v.
Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 145, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975)).
436. Id. at 269-70 (citing Rowe, 216 Va. at 145, 216 S.E.2d at 213).
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eas.43 7 Because the Board's discussion in this case was replete
with references to the visual intrusiveness of the taller tower, the
district court determined that the fundamental difference be-
tween the two towers was aesthetic in nature.43 The Fourth Cir-
cuit turned to the enabling legislation for zoning ordinances to
conclude that:
[Liocal governments may regulate the "size, height, area, bulk, loca-
tion, erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, main-
tenance, razing, or removal of structures."... No matter what zon-
ing practices are actually prohibited because of an undue emphasis
on aesthetic values, Virginia law specifically authorizes a considera-
tion of factors such as size, height, and bulk. The Board's considera-
tion of the height of the proposed tower, therefore, is proper.439
The Board's decision was based upon the proposed tower's incon-
sistencies with Montgomery County's zoning ordinances and land
use guidelines.4 0 The Board argued that the location and design
of the proposed tower did not conform to the county's comprehen-
sive plan." 1 Consequently, the proposed tower's failure to adhere
to the applicable zoning requirements provided substantial evi-
dence to justify the rejection of the tower." 2
H. Mold Cases
Mold cases, which were hailed as "the next asbestos," may be a
more difficult type of case for the plaintiffs' bar to maintain as
shown in the case of Roche v. Lincoln Property Co.441 In Roche, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
ruled on several questions important to this area. The first pub-
lished opinion in this case relates to the disqualification of the
plaintiffs expert witness. ' The Roches claimed that their
apartment was poorly maintained and that there were water
leaks, holes in the wall, and mold growing within the apart-
437. See Id. at 269; Rowe, 216 Va. at 144-45, 266 S.E.2d at 212-13.
438. See USCOC of Va., 343 F.3d at 269.
439. Id. at 270.
440. Id. at 271.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. 278 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003).
444. Id. at 745.
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ment.44" The plaintiffs retained an environmental testing service
consultant who concluded that there was "'extensive' mold con-
tamination in the apartment."446 Subsequent to leaving the
apartment, various members of the Roche family, including Mr.
Roche, complained of ailments ranging from memory loss to hy-
persensitivity.4 47 When the Roches visited Dr. Bernstein, an aller-
gist, the doctor recommended that, among other things, Mr.
Roche stop smoking, that the Roches find a new home for their
cat, and that they start a low-sugar diet.44 Dr. Bernstein also
found that the Roches were allergic to mold and other items,
namely mites, cockroaches, cats, dust, most wheats, and
grasses.449
At trial, Dr. Bernstein testified that the mold in the apartment
was the source of the plaintiffs' ailments.45 ° In ruling in favor of
the defendant and excluding Dr. Bernstein's expert testimony,
the court concluded that (i) Dr. Bernstein failed to adhere to the
established methodology of differential diagnosis by not ruling in
the suspected causes and by not ruling out other possible
causes,451 (ii) he failed to establish how various reports and stud-
ies showing some correlation between exposure to mold and aller-
gic reactions supported his conclusions and that the mold in the
apartment was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs ailment,452
and (iii) he relied solely on temporal relation of the Roches' expo-
sure to the onset of their symptoms to arrive at his conclusions.453
The court emphasized that "'the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only rele-
vant, but reliable.' 45 4 "Conjecture or 'subjective belief or 'unsup-
ported speculation' will not suffice." 45 The lack of detail in the
445. Id. at 746.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 746-47.
449. Id. at 747.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 752-53.
452. Id. at 755.
453. Id. at 764.
454. Id. at 748 (quoting Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589 (1993)).
455. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). Courts generally consider four factors in
determining whether the theory or technique is scientifically valid: "(1) whether the theory
or technique used by the expert can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
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expert's analysis and testimony was also telling. It appeared that
most of the conclusions reached were based on the fact that the
Roches were asymptomatic when they moved into the apartment
and became ill while they were there.456
In a separate opinion, the district court considered the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment.45 This motion was based on
the theory of negligence per se, alleging that the landlord violated
"building codes."45 The court noted that the only relevant statute
was the Virginia Residential Landlord Tenant Act ("VRLTA").4"9
Due to the failure of the plaintiffs expert testimony, the court
could not reach the conclusion that the apartment was uninhab-
itable under the VRLTA.460 Tests failed to sufficiently demon-
strate the level or degree of toxic mold in the apartment.46 '
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs could not estab-
lish that the presence of mold was the proximate cause of their
health problems.462 The plaintiffs' own expert, however, gave tes-
timony suggesting that other lifestyle choices could have been the
root of the problem.
In addition to the negligence per se theory, the plaintiffs ad-
vanced a theory of simple negligence.463 The burden was upon the
plaintiff to show that the defendants "'deviated from the standard
ordinary care, either by failing to observe applicable trade cus-
rate of error of the method used; and (4) the degree of the method's or conclusion's accep-
tance within the relevant scientific community." Id. at 748; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-
94; United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1995).
456. Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 764-65.
457. Roche v. Lincoln Property Co., No. 02-1390-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23353, at *1
(E.D. Va. July 25, 2003).
458. Id. at *1-3, 10.
459. Id. at *10-11. Virginia Code section 55-248.13 articulates the standard for fitness
of premises to include "(1) compl[iance] with the requirements of applicable building and
housing codes materially affecting health and safety; (2) mak[ing] all repairs and do[ing]
whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition... ; (4)
maintain[ing] in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sani-
tary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning . . . required to be supplied by the [land-
lord] .... VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (Supp. 2004).
460. Roche, 2003 Dist. LEXIS 23353, at *13.
461. Id. at*12.
462. Id. at *15. Expert testimony is required to prove that exposure to a certain sub-
stance caused a certain injury or illness. Id. at **15-16 (citing Cavallo v. Star Enterprise,
892 F. Supp. 756, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995), rev'd in part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th
Cir. 1996); Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 1993)).
463. Id. at *17.
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toms and building code provisions or by some other defalca-
tion."'4 4 The plaintiffs, however, failed to introduce any evidence
in the case that the landlord had knowledge of a hazardous condi-
tion within the premises or that the defendant's conduct violated
customary industry standards.465 The court concluded that the de-
fendant's own policies on treatment of mold could not be used to
establish an appropriate standard of care.466 For similar reasons,
the court did not agree with the plaintiffs contention that the
landlord breached an implied warranty of habitability.467 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to
all counts.468
III. 2004 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Deeds of Trust
1. The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 55-
60(2) to provide that "[a]ny deed of trust securing a loan, proceeds
of which are used by the borrower to acquire the secured real
property, shall be deemed to be a purchase money deed of
trust."469 This revision provides a lender with the protections of a
purchase money deed of trust, regardless of whether the "magic
language" is inserted in the document.
2. The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 55-
66.3 to allow a lien creditor to file a certificate of satisfaction di-
rectly with the clerk of the court, unless the settlement agent
provides to the lien creditor a written request to receive the cer-
tificate.47 0 The lien creditor must provide the settlement agent
with a copy of the certificate, if filed directly by the lender. 1
464. Id. at *18 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Wingate, 254 Va. 169, 173, 492 S.E.2d
122, 124 (1997)).
465. Id. at **19-21.
466. Id. at *21 (citing Pullen v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342,350, 310 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1983)).
467. Id. at *22.
468. Id. at *30.
469. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 253, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-60(2) (Supp. 2004)).
470. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 596, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-66.3 (Supp. 2004)).
471. Id.
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3. The General Assembly modified Virginia Code section 6.1-
2.25, part of the Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act
("CRESPA"), to provide licensing authorities the right to issue
summonses and subpoenas and to issue orders restraining a per-
son from acting contrary to CRESPA.472 CRESPA was also modi-
fied to provide that "[a] final order of the licensing authority im-
posing a penalty or ordering restitution may be recorded,
enforced, and satisfied as orders or decrees of a circuit court upon
certification of such order by the licensing authority."473
B. Recording Tax
1. The General Assembly modified Virginia Code section 58.1-
811(A) to make the outlined exceptions applicable to contracts
and leases as well as deeds.474
2. Virginia Code sections 58.1-811(A)(2) and (B)(2) exempt from
recording tax and the grantor's tax, deeds to an incorporated
church or religious body.475 Previously, those provisions pertained
only to deeds to or from the trustees or trustee of a church or reli-
gious body.476
3. The General Assembly also modified the recording taxes to
provide for an additional $1.00 fee on every deed admitted to re-
cord in those jurisdictions in which open space easements are
held by the Virginia Outdoors Foundation.477 These fees are to be
distributed to the Foundation on a monthly basis.478
C. Landlord /Tenant
1. The General Assembly modified the Virginia Residential
472. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 597, 2004 Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 336, 2004
Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN § 6.1-2.25 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
473. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 597, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-2.27 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
474. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 626, 2004 Va. Acts -; Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 492, 2004
Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
475. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
476. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 626, 2004 Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 492, 2004
Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
477. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 990, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-817 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
478. Id.
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Landlord and Tenant Act479 to provide that if a rental agreement
provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees in the
event of a breach of the agreement, the court shall award those
fees, unless the tenant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the failure to pay rent or vacate was due to a breach of the
lease by the landlord or unlawful actions on the part of the land-
lord.4"' The Act was also modified to authorize the landlord, upon
determination of the existence of a non-emergency property con-
dition in the dwelling unit, to temporarily relocate the tenant
from the unit in order to alleviate the condition under certain cir-
cumstances, with the landlord bearing all costs and risks of the
move. 481' The failure of the tenant to cooperate with the temporary
removal is deemed a breach of the rental agreement unless the
tenant agrees to vacate the unit and terminate the rental agree-
ment.4
2
2. The General Assembly modified the Virginia Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act 483 to obligate the landlord to note upon
move-in whether there is any visible evidence of mold in the
dwelling unit.' The tenant has the option of objecting to the re-
port within five days after receipt. 5 If the report states that
there is visible evidence of mold, the tenant has the option to
terminate the tenancy or accept the dwelling unit in its as-is con-
dition.4 6 These modifications appear to be geared toward placing
a clear duty of disclosure and maintenance on the landlord and a
duty on the tenant to timely object and report deficiencies of the
unit to the landlord. With these new requirements in place, hope-
fully litigation of this issue will be reduced and these matters will
be addressed like any other condition in need of repair.
3. The General Assembly modified the Virginia Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act" 7 to clarify and codify the interplay be-
479. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.2 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp 2004).
480. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 232, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.31 (Supp. 2004)).
481. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 307, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.18(B) (Supp. 2004)).
482. Id.
483. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.2 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp. 2004).
484. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 226, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.11:2 (Supp. 2004)).
485. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.11:2 (Supp. 2004).
486. Id.
487. Id. § 55-288.2 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp. 2004).
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tween security deposits, damage insurance, and renters insur-
ance.4"' Virginia Code section 55-248.7:2(A) allows the landlord to
require as a condition of the lease that the tenant pay for the cost
of commercial damage insurance and/or commercial property and
casualty insurance as a rider to the landlord's policy.4 9 The an-
nual cost of the damage insurance, however, plus the renters in-
surance plus the amount of any security deposit held by the land-
lord may not exceed the amount of two months' periodic rent.49 °
Any renters insurance obtained by the landlord must name the
tenant as an additional insured, placing the tenant in privity
with the insurer.49'
D. Zoning
1. The General Assembly modified Virginia Code section 15.2-
2204, governing the advertisement of plans, ordinances, and zon-
ing amendments, to obligate the local jurisdiction to provide writ-
ten notice to a parcel owner of any proposed amendment to the
zoning ordinance involving a change that would decrease the al-
lowed dwelling unit density on such parcel.492 The General As-
sembly also modified Virginia Code section 15.2-2204 to require
the local governing authority to provide notice to the commanding
officer of any military base installation or airport of any proposed
changes in land use within 3,000 feet of such base.493
2. The General Assembly clarified Virginia Code section 15.2-
2241(6) to make mandatory the provisions of a subdivision ordi-
nance pursuant to which the subdivider may be obligated to pro-
vide shared easements to cable operators, public service corpora-
tions, gas, telephone, and electric service for the subdivision.494
3. Virginia Code section 15.2-2300 obligates the zoning admin-
488. Act of Mar. 15, 2004, ch. 123, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.7:2 (Supp. 2004)).
489. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.7:2(A) (Supp. 2004).
490. Id.
491. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.7:2(C) (Supp. 2004).
492. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 799, 2004 Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 539, 2004
Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(B) (Supp. 2004)).
493. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 799, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2204(D) (Supp. 2004)).
494. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 952, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2241(6) (Supp. 2004)).
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istrator to maintain a zoning map that provides ready cross-
referencing between the parcels and any zoning conditions affect-
ing such parcels.49 The General Assembly modified this section to
require that such index also provides "ready access to all prof-
fered cash payments and expenditures disclosure reports pre-
pared by the local governing body pursuant to [Virginia Code sec-
tion] 15.2-2303.2." 496
4. The General Assembly modified Virginia Code section 43-3
regarding mechanic's liens to clarify that any mechanic's lien as-
sociated with work or materials furnished relative to an easement
shall only attach to the easement and not to fee simple title to the
real estate.497
5. The General Assembly clarified Virginia Code section 17.1-
227, governing the recording of documents among land records, so
it is now the responsibility of the attorney or party who prepares
or submits an instrument to ensure that social security numbers
are removed from the instrument prior to the instrument being
submitted for recordation.498
E. Eminent Domain
1. The General Assembly modified Virginia Code section 33.1-
132 to reduce from one year to 180 days the time by which Com-
missioners or a jury must be appointed to ascertain the amount of
compensation to be paid when property is taken by the Common-
wealth Transportation Commissioner without instituting con-
demnation proceedings.499 In addition, the General Assembly
added Virginia Code section 33.1-120(F), forbidding the Com-
monwealth Transportation Commissioner from forcing a property
owner to relocate from improved owner-occupied property until
the owner is permitted to withdraw the funds represented by the
495. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2300 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
496. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 531, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2300 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
497. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 240, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
498. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 352, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-227 (Supp. 2004)).
499. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 804, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 33.1-132 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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certificate filed with the court. °0 If the owner refuses to withdraw
the funds, however, or if the Commissioner reasonably believes
that the owner does not possess clear title or that certain owners
cannot be located, the Commissioner can petition the court to
force relocation.501
The General Assembly amended the method for calculating
damage to condemned land that is the subject of a conservation or
redevelopment plan pursuant to Virginia Code section 36.48.02 In
that section, owners are encouraged to redevelop blighted area
pursuant to an overall development plan.50 3 In the event that, af-
ter the adoption of such plan, the local jurisdiction downzones the
property without the consent of a property owner and then seeks
to condemn a portion of it, the valuation shall be made as of the
date that the initial redevelopment plan was adopted, not as of
the downzoning. °4
F. Property Owners' Association Act/Condominium Act
1. With the exception of meeting minutes or other confidential
records of an executive session of the board of directors, the min-
utes of the board of directors of a property owners' association
must be "open for inspection and copying (i) within 60 days from
the conclusion of the meeting to which such minutes appertain or
(ii) when such minutes are distributed to board members as part
of an agenda package for the next meeting of the board of direc-
tors, whichever occurs first."
55
2. The General Assembly deleted Virginia Code section 55-
79.81(C). 50 6 This provision established, in the absence of language
in the condominium instruments to the contrary, that the asso-
ciation was responsible for insurance deductibles for any casualty
damage arising in the common elements and a unit owner was
500. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 803, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-
120(F) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
501. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-120(F) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
502. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 540, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 25.1-107 (Supp. 2004)).
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-510(E) (Supp. 2004).
506. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 281, 2004 Va. Acts-
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responsible for damage arising from activities within the unit. °7
3. The General Assembly modified both the Virginia Condomin-
ium Act °. and the Property Owners' Association Act 09 to clarify
that an action to foreclose any liens that have been perfected un-
der the provisions of either Act must be initiated within thirty-six
months from the time the memorandum of lien was filed.510
4. The General Assembly also modified both Acts to clarify the
procedure for conducting a non-judicial foreclosure to sell a unit
in satisfaction of an assessment lien, including notice require-
ments, the appointment of a trustee, the conduct of the sale, the
priority of liens, the duty of the trustee to find an accounting, and
a one-year time limitation on the purchaser's right to seek an or-
der of the court to overturn the sale. 11
5. The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 55-
510.1 to provide that the meetings of not only the board of direc-
tors, but also any subcommittee or other committee thereof, shall
be open to all members of record of the association, and all infor-
mation distributed therein shall similarly be open to scrutiny.512
G. Real Estate Time-Share Act
This revision allows a time-share developer to use a reverter
deed, automatically vesting the developer with title to the prop-
erty, in lieu of a deed of trust in the event of a default by the
time-share owner.513 In order to qualify for a "time-share estate
subject to reverter," the owner must not be entitled to occupy the
unit for more than four weeks in any one-year period and must
have put down less than a 20% down payment.1 4 Modifications to
507. Id.
508. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.39 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
509. Id. § 55-508 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp. 2004).
510. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 786, 2004 Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 779, 2004
Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 778, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-516(E), -79.84(D) (Supp. 2004)).
511. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 786, 2004 Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 779, 2004
Va. Acts _; Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 778, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-516(I), -79.84(I) (Supp. 2004)).
512. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 333, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-510.1(A) (Supp. 2004)).
513. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-376.1(B) (Supp. 2004).
514. Id. § 55-362 (Supp. 2004).
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the Act also provide for significant disclosures at the time of sale
and the procedure for divesting the owner of the time-share es-
tate, including a sixty-day default period with a thirty-day right
to cure after notice.515
H. Real Estate Cooperative Act
1. The General Assembly modified the Cooperative Act, gener-
ally, to allow for the cooperative type of ownership to exist with-
out separate subdivision approval, provided that the improve-
ments within the cooperative are the subject of an approved site
plan. 16 Phase lines will not be considered subdivision lines for
purposes of the Subdivision Ordinance, unless the cooperative
developer seeks to convey the phase off to another party, and
such land will no longer be considered part of the cooperative.517
515. Id. § 55-376.1(E) (Supp. 2004).
516. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 242, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-429(B) (Supp 2004)).
517. Id. § 55-429(C) (Supp. 2004).
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